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INTRODUCTION

Many religious systems purport to regulate the commercial,
as well as the ritual, conduct of their adherents. To the extent
that religious law is autonomous, parties can predict its consequences and fashion their business negotiations and investments
accordingly. Where, as in the United States, religious rules coexist with a separate, secular legal system which may have fundamentally dissimilar conceptualizations of legal entities and
norms, there are inherent dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation leading to unanticipated and undesirable commercial
consequences.
This article addresses one example of this phenomenon. A
Jewish "permissible venture"' is a unique contractual arrangement devised under Jewish law 2 to circumvent the religious prohibition on the collection or payment of interest.3 A permissible
I A literal translation of the term used for the contract is "permission for a
venture." The Hebrew is transliterated in many ways including hetter iska, hetter
isske, hetter iske and heter iskoh. The phrase "permissible venture" is employed to
refer to the agreement and to the venture itself.
2 The term "Jewish law" is used merely for convenience to refer to the body of
Jewish religious precepts known as halakhah which is a transliteration from Hebrew,
generally translated as "law." In this article I neither describe this body of precepts
nor evaluate whether it should properly be called "law," as that term is technically
employed in legal literature.
3 The ban on the payment and collection of interest in transactions between
Jews is of biblical origin. See Exodus 22:25 ("If you lend money to any of my people
with you who is poor, you shall not be to him as a creditor, and you shall not exact
interest from him."); Leviticus 25:35-37 ("And if your brother becomes poor, and
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venture substitutes an investment scheme in lieu of a loan without meaningfully altering the parties' respective rights. Within
the realm ofJewish law, this device has been employed for centuries to facilitate consumer as well as commercial financing.
Under Jewish law, the implications of a permissible venture
are quite different from those of a partnership under American
law. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the permissible venture,
especially as it is commonly composed, would be perceived
through the prism of secular law as a partnership, yielding unintended adverse ramifications for one or both of the parties. This
possibility exists where the permissible venture is employed, perhaps with even greater frequency in recent years,4 by institutional
and individual lenders, in major United States financial centers
and throughout the world.5
In Part II, I will describe how the permissible venture works.
In Part III, I will explain why American law might treat the permissible venture as a partnership, and I will identify the attendant
negative repercussions. In Part IV, I will explore whether the
Jewish and secular legal systems are sufficiently flexible to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, the risk of such an unfortunate outcome by allowing the religious objective to be obtained
without the attendant adverse commercial ramifications. I will
also evaluate a variety of analytical approaches, some of which
would warrant, from a technical, legal, and policy perspective,
characterization of the permissive venture as a loan. In Part V, I
will survey alternatives to the permissible venture which have
been suggested to avoid the Jewish ban on interest.
cannot maintain himself with you, you shall maintain him.... Take no interest from
him or increase, but fear your God. . . .You shall not lend him your money at
interest ....");Deuteronomy 23:20-21 ("To a foreigner you may lend upon interest,
but to your brother you shall not lend upon interest.").
4 Increased awareness of the need for permissible ventures is evidenced by the
recent publication of related English articles and Hebrew treatises. In addition,
various religious organizations have recently taken steps to further educate Jews
about permissible ventures through informative mailings and seminars. A number
of lending institutions have recently adopted general permissible ventures. A discussion of general permissible ventures can be found in Part II, infra.
5 Israeli financial institutions ordinarily utilize the general permissible venture
described in Part II, infra. Additionally, both institutional and individual investors
may employ permissible ventures in international transactions.
The interplay between religious and secular law regarding the charging of interest might also be studied in the context of a different religious law system, such
as Moslem law, which also bans interest, or a secular law system other than that of
the United States. Although each instance will present its own peculiar facts and
tensions, this article may provide a useful initial analytical framework.
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THE BAN ON INTEREST UNDER JEWISH LAW AND THE USE OF
THE PERMISSIBLE VENTURE

A.

Scope of the Jewish Law Ban on Interest

The prohibition on the payment and collection of interest in
transactions between Jews applies equally to all loans, whether
for consumer or commercial purposes. 6 Similarly, the prohibition applies not only to third party loans, but also to purchase
money mortgage financing provided by sellers of businesses or
properties. Moreover, it does not matter if the parties are related
or strangers.7 The interdiction may apply even if the entities involved are not individuals. Although there are differing views on
transactions involving partnerships or corporations, the predominant position is that if a majority of the partnership is owned by
or the corporate stock is held by Jews, the proscription applies. 8
B.

The Individualized Permissible Venture
Although there is no single form of a permissible venture, 9

6 See supra note 4. A religiously observant Jew would be required to avoid this
prohibition even if the other party is a non-observant Jew. I use the term "religiously observant" to refer to thoseJews'who seek to be characterized as comporting
themselves within the parameters prescribed in traditional Jewish legal-religious
texts, such as the SHULKHAN ARUKH.
7 ARBA'AH TURIM,

Yoreh De'ah 160;

SHULKHAN ARUKH,

Yoreh De'ah 160.

8 There are many differing opinions. At one extreme there are views that the

ban on interest applies only to a lender who is an individual. See Y. RISHA, SHEVUS
YAAKOV 166 (citing but not agreeing with S. BEE'ER, BEE'ER OSHOK). At the other
extreme is the view that the charging of interest is impermissible even where a
single partner or shareholder is Jewish, because the loan is treated as having been
made on a pro rata basis by each of the partners or shareholders. See Y. BEAu, BRIS
YEHUDA 508 (1979).
The predominant opinion, however, states that the prohibition only applies if
the majority of the business is owned by Jews. One explanation is that the partnership or corporation is an entity possessing a discrete identity and this identity is
either Jewish or non-Jewish based on who owns a majority of the ownership interests. See M. SILBERBERG, V'CHAI AKHIKAH I'MAHK, 33 (1986). Another explanation
for the majority rule involves the application ofJewish law principles known as brera
or battel brov which permit the transaction to be treated under Jewish law as if the
loans were made by the non-Jewish partners or shareholders to the Jewish borrower. Id. See also Z. SHAPIRO, DARKAY TSHUVAH, 150 (1976); Y. NATHANSON,
SHO'EL U'MAYSHIV I, § 3.31 (1973).
A parallel debate exists in secular law to determine whether a partnership or
corporation is an entity separate and apart from the identity of its owners. See
Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons 29 HARv. L. REV. 838 (1916);
Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16
VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963); Note, The Partnershipas a Legal Entity, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
698 (1941).
9 See generally J. BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS II (1983) (a discussion of the historical development of various types of permissible ventures).
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the most common permissible venture contemplates that the
party seeking funding (Recipient) will receive fifty percent of the
money as a non-interest bearing loan. The remaining fifty percent is invested by the party furnishing the funds (Financier).
The Recipient obligates himself to use all of the monies in conjunction with a business venture'" and to share the profits and
losses with the Financier on a specified basis."' The permissible
venture may provide that, irrespective of the business' actual
losses, the Financier's potential loss is limited to the amount of
his investment.' 2 The Financier pays some nominal sum, usually
one dollar, to the Recipient in consideration for the Recipient's
agreement to dedicate himself to the commercial venture.
The permissible venture ordinarily contains a clause requiring the Recipient to repay the amount loaned to him (i.e., fifty
percent of the total funds advanced) on or before a specific date.
The obligation to repay the loan is unconditional.
In order to assure the Financier of a virtually risk-free fixed
percentage return on all the money advanced, additional provisions are commonly included in the permissible venture. First,
the permissible venture establishes a presumption 13 that the
business is sufficiently profitable to provide the required return
placing the burden on the Recipient to prove otherwise. To
meet the burden, the Recipient must take a solemn oath in accordance with Jewish law.' 4 Another provision recites that the
The earliest permissible venture agreement of which there is a written record dated
back to the sixteenth century. Id. at 376. Professor Bleich reviewed the rabbinic
debate as to the efficacy of a permissible venture in avoiding the religious ban
against interest, a debate which has now largely been resolved in the affirmative. Id.
The focus of the instant article does not address when a permissible venture should
be utilized but, rather, the possible secular ramifications when it is used.
10 As discussed later in section IV, infra, the notion of a business venture may be
extraordinarily elastic.
I' There is flexibility regarding the proportional sharing of profits and losses.
Many permissible venture agreements, however, injudiciously call for profits and
losses to be shared equally, even if the parties have disproportionate investments in
the venture.
12 The Financier's investment equals one-half of the total money advanced to
the Recipient. As discussed in Part II, infra, this clause might permit the filing of a
limited partnership agreement, even after the fact, which would shield the Financier from the claims of third parties. Even if the clause proves ineffective as to third
parties, it should be enforceable between the Financier and the Recipient so as to
permit the Financier to receive indemnification from the Recipient. Nevertheless, a
review of various permissible venture documents revealed that none contained restrictions on liability.
13 Individual permissible ventures may employ different terminology but the effect is to create a presumption.
14 Many Jewish law authorities contend that, if the Financier personally believes
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Financier agrees to relieve the Recipient from the obligation to
take an oath and to give up his share of the profits in exchange
for periodic payments equal to the amount of interest the Financier would have received if he had loaned all of the monies to a
non-Jewish borrower. Thus, in light of religiously observant
Jews' strong aversion to oath-taking, the Recipient ordinarily
would make the periodic, interest-like payments. 5
Even if the Recipient is willing to take an oath, he can only
establish that the business earned no profit. The duty to repay
the sum invested applies unless it is properly established that the
venture sustained losses. To prove that there were net losses,
which relieve the Recipient of the obligation to repay, the Recipient must adduce the testimony of two reliable and trustworthy
witnesses, determined according to Jewish law. Because Jewish
law requirements regarding witnesses are quite exacting, this
standard is exceedingly difficult to satisfy.' 6 Moreover, the perthat there were no profits, he cannot force the Recipient to take an oath, even
though the permissible venture agreement is silent on this point. See, e.g., M. FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah, II, 62-63; S. TABAK, TESHUROT SHAI, I, 3; PANIM
ME'IROT, II, 3. But see S. GREENFELD, TESHUVOT MANARSHAG, Yoreh De'ah, 4. The

position that a Recipient cannot be forced to take an oath is based on Jewish law
precepts regarding the taking of an oath which are independent of the particular
clauses of the permissible venture agreement. Accordingly, the Recipient would be
discharged from his obligation of making the fixed payment scheduled in the permissible venture document without having to take an oath. In commercial transactions, however, the likelihood that the Financier would have direct knowledge as to
the operation's profitability is rare. Moreover, where, as in most instances, the permissible venture agreement does not prescribe the nature of the venture and the
Recipient is engaged in various business activities, including, for example, stock
market investments, it would be virtually impossible for the Financier to know
whether there were profits or losses and the oath may be required according to all
authorities. See M. STERNBUCH, MO'ADIM U-ZEMANIM, VI, 4 1.
15 See BLEICH, supra note 9, at 378. Because this aversion may have become at-

tenuated in recent years, some rabbinic authorities have suggested alternative conditions including allowing the Financier to examine the Recipient's financial
records and to participate in all decisions regarding expenditure of the sums advanced until and unless the fixed amounts are paid. Id. at 381. To the degree that
the Financier possesses the power to control the operations of the business, there is
a greater likelihood that the permissible venture will be characterized as a partnership. Indeed, even where there is no initial intent to establish a partnership, courts
have increasingly found lenders liable as principals when they exercised control in
their borrowers' businesses. See Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103 BANKING L.J. 220 (1987); Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984); Sanchez,
Symposium: Lender Liability, 15 W. ST. L. REV. 577 (1988).
16 See, e.g., I. ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 185 (1975)
("Jewish law relating to testimony is noted for its many restrictions with respect to
the competence of witnesses. Among others, close relatives, wives, interested par-

ties, persons guilty of religious transgression are disqualified.").
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missible venture agreement may demand that any such testimony
come from particular persons, even though it is highly improbable that the named individuals will be in a position to offer

testimony. 17
A permissible venture agreement may also establish an irrebuttable presumption that the money invested by the Financier
was utilized in those business activities of the Recipient which
were in fact the most profitable during the term of the
agreement.
The permissible venture may also be limited as to scope.
The Recipient may have an ongoing business in which he invested a great deal of money. The permissible venture may be
used for the purpose of raising additional funds for specific
equipment or projects in connection with that business. Therefore, the permissible venture may not be intended to create an
investment in the Recipient's entire business, but only in the particular area for which the funds were advanced by the Financier.' 8
C.

The General Permissible Venture

A number of institutional lenders have adopted a "general
permissible venture" document, either as a'substitute for or supplement to an individualized document for each particular deal.' 9
This document is executed only by representatives of the lender
and declares that all of the lender's transactions shall be permissible ventures under Jewish law. It further states that its terms
govern even if the other party or parties to such transactions are
17 See I. ISSERLIN, TERUMAT HA-DESHEN, 302 (the Financier may require that
only the testimony of the community's rabbi and cantor will be acceptable, despite
the fact that their testimony, as a practical matter, is essentially impossible to
secure).
18 A Recipient may arrange separate permissible ventures with different lenders
for discrete investments in connection with a single ongoing business. The Recipient will have a direct relationship with each of the Financiers, but the Financiers will
not bear any direct relationship with each other.
A Recipient might also enter into two permissible ventures and pool the funds
for a single investment, such as the purchase of one piece of equipment for use in
his business. If a permissible venture is viewed as a partnership, the Recipient
would be a partner with the first Financier and also with the second Financier. The
two partnerships, by putting their assets together for one investment, may be partners as well. If the permissible venture does not create a partnership, the scenario
would presumably be identical to the one in the preceding paragraph where the
Recipient is directly related to each of the Financiers, but the Financiers are independent of each other.
19 In this way, even if the lender fails to prepare a personalized permissible venture in a given case, it will have complied with Jewish law according to some
authorities.
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unaware ofJewish law. Although the general permissible venture
is a unilateral contract, its enforceability from a Jewish law standpoint is based on the assumption that persons dealing with a
lending institution will accept its standard terms, even if they are
not familiar with its details.2z
The general permissible venture is of little independent significance to the themes in this article. To the extent the borrower or depositor is aware of and agrees to the general
permissible venture terms, the implications are the same as if an
individualized permissible venture agreement had been executed. By contrast, if the borrower or depositor is unaware of the
general permissible venture or if its terms contradict the specific
documentation for the transaction in question, the general per2
missible venture should be null and void. '
D.

Differences Between the Jewish Shutfus and the Secular Partnership

The permissible venture is recognized by Jewish law as a
form of shutfus. The term shutfus is often translated into English
as partnership. Yet the Jewish law regarding a shutfus differs significantly from secular partnership law. UnderJewish law, for instance, a person can invest in and share the profits of a shutfus
without being personally liable for any loss. Moreover, one
member of a shutfus is not necessarily authorized to bind another
personally. Nor is one member of a shutfus vicariously liable for
the acts of another.
The parties entering into a permissible venture agreement
customarily intend that their agreement contain the restrictions
customary in a shutfus. Although the terms, as I will explain in
Part IV, might prevent the permissible venture from being characterized by a secular court as a partnership, they in no way interfere with the parties' religious objectives. Jewish law does not
care how secular law labels the permissive venture relationship.
It is sufficient that the terms of the permissible venture agree22
ment are enforceable.
Y. BIAu, supra note 8, at 631.
Even if the specific documentation contains boilerplate language purporting
to incorporate the lender's general "official terms and conditions," the language
should not incorporate contradictory terms.
22 Some Jewish law authorities may believe that for religious purposes it is irrelevant whether a secular court would enforce the terms of the agreement. The better, and apparently predominant view, however, is that secular enforceability of the
agreement's provisions is essential, particularly where institutional lenders are in20
21
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A.

TREATMENT OF THE PERMISSIBLE VENTURE
AS A SECULAR PARTNERSHIP

The Risk of Treatment as a Partnership
1.

Partnership Features

A number of the features of a permissible venture may lead
to its characterization as a partnership rather than as a loan. For
example, in a permissible venture the Financier invests in the Recipient's business and the Financier shares in the profits of the
business. Further, the Financier, at least to the extent of his investment, shares in the losses of the business and there is no unconditional obligation on the Recipient to repay the investment.
Additionally, in a permissible venture, the Financier may possess
certain implicit or explicit powers of control over the business.
Several legal commentators have described the permissible
venture as a partnership without any qualification which would
suggest that it was a partnership only underJewish law.2 3 Rather,
the implication is that a permissible venture constitutes a partnership under secular law as well. One professor has concluded,
apparently approvingly, that "the . . . [permissible venture] has
... been recognized by the civil courts as an instrument creating
a bona fide partnership.... "124
2.

Circumstances Enhancing the Risk

Several factors increase the practical risk that a permissible
venture will be treated as a secular partnership. First, permissible venture agreements are often improperly drafted. Not only
do the agreements needlessly omit terms which would evidence
the parties' intent not to create a partnership, but the agreements
frequently contain affirmatively misleading language.
volved. See M. SILBERBERG, supra note 8, at 631. Secular enforceability is also important where one of the parties is likely to submit disputes to a secular court.
An issue arises under Jewish law as to how it should be determined whether a
permissible venture agreement is enforceable under secular law. A Jewish law tribunal could choose to interpret applicable secular law itself, relying in part on testimony from secular scholars, attorneys, judges or other authorities. See M.
FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Khoshen Mishpat II, 62. Alternatively, the parties may
seek an actual secular determination of this issue, for example, through an action
for declaratory judgment. An interesting question is whether, for Jewish law pur-

poses, the Jewish law tribunal's interpretation of secular law could overrule a ruling
of a secular trial or appellate court.
23 J.BLEICH, supra note 9, at 381; M. ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OFJEWISH LAW COIs.
187, 504 (1975); G. HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OFJEWISH LAw 562 (1953). The latter
source sometimes refer to it as a limited partnership. G. HOROWITZ at 562.
24 J. BLEICH, supra note 9, at 381.
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One of the crucial issues that a court considers in determining whether a partnership was formed is the intent of the parties.
Where the parties agree to provisions uncharacteristic of a partnership, a court will be more inclined to find that the parties did
not intend to create a partnership. Thus, for example, by including in the permissible venture agreement the shutfus restrictions
referred to in Part II, D, a draftsman could improve the
probability that the venture will be treated as a loan.
Unfortunately, the permissible venture agreement is ordinarily prepared by rabbinic scholars whose knowledge of applicable
commercial law concepts or rules, and, sometimes even of English, is limited. Attorneys are in most cases excluded from document preparation because the parties believe that the agreement
is, at least as a practical matter, of religious significance only, and
they advise their attorneys accordingly. In fact, the parties may
not even inform their attorneys that a permissible venture agreement will be executed.
Drafting problems often result in the permissible venture
agreement. For example, the agreement may neglect to limit the
extent of the Financier's liability in the event that the venture
sustains net losses. Although under Jewish law a Financier need
not be personally liable for such losses, a typical permissible venture form contains the following provision:
I (we) the undersigned do hereby state that I (we) have received from
the sum of
to be returned
which shall be used in the form of a joint
business venture. All of the profit that I (we) may earn as a
result of the said
which is to be used in the business venture shall be divided equally, i.e. 50% shall inure to
the benefit of myself (ourselves) with the other 50% going to
the [Financier]. The same shall apply to any losses in the above business venture.

The final clause seems to render the Financier personally liable for
fifty percent of all partnership losses rather than limiting his liability
to the extent of his investment. Yet, this departure from the shutfus
approach is usually inadvertent.2 5
Another example is the use of terms such as partnership or, as
in the excerpt above, joint business venture, to characterize the Financier-Recipient relationship. Such phraseology is innocently in25 For instance, the rabbi who authored the provision excerpted above told me
that he had intended that the Financier's exposure would be limited to the amount
of his investment and that he had, in fact, explained the agreement to those who
used his forms as if there were such a restriction.
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tended as an approximate translation for the word shutfus, but its
inclusion is not intended as a secular law term of art. Yet, the use of
such terms could be construed as incorporating into the agreement
all of the legal baggage attendant to a secular partnership. Triers of
fact are likely to be unfamiliar with the intricacies or nuances ofJewish law and may be predisposed to rely on the rules of secular partnership law unless the agreement undeniably evidences a contrary
intention.
3.

The "Wild-card" of Judicial Review

The vagaries of judicial review are clear from the only two
reported United States cases, 26 which arguably reached opposite
conclusions. The decisions make unreliable precedents and underscore the risks inherent in case by case adjudication. Consequently, parties must fear that their permissible venture will be
construed as a partnership, even if agreements in arguably similar situations have been treated as loans.
In a 1968 decision, Leibovicki v. Rawicki, 27 the Recipient refused to repay the Financier the agreed rate of interest, claiming
that the interest was usurious.2 8 The Financier gave the Recipient $5,000 "for the purpose of investing the same in the Real
Estate field, Apartment Houses, Office Buildings, Mortgages,
Real Estate Improvements, etc." ' z9 The written agreement between the parties provided that the Recipient guaranteed return
of the Financier's principal 3° and that the Financier would receive
profits, if any, up to a maximum of ten percent per annum of the
monies advanced. 3 ' The contract recited that it would be subject
to a permissible venture agreement, but there was no explanation
of the terms of the agreement other than to state that it forbade
26 Leibovicki v. Rawicki, 57 Misc. 2d 141, 290 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968);
Bollag v. Dresdner, 130 Misc. 2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985). One
would expect to find a number of Israeli cases dealing with permissible venture
agreements. Nonetheless, I know of only one published opinion, Bank HaMizrachi
HaMiyuchad v. Zvi Tessler (Beis Mishpat Ha-Mekhuzi, Tel Aviv, Sept. 28, 1987).
Although that case treated the permissible venture agreement as an enforceable
contract, none of the partnership implications were raised.
27 57 Misc. 2d 141, 290 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
28 Id. at 142-43, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
29 Id. at 142, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99.
30 It should be noted that a formal, explicit guarantee by the Recipient to return
all of the Financier's capital violates Jewish law. In this case, it is unclear whether,
under Jewish law, the reference subordinating the undertaking to the unspecified
terms of a permissible venture agreement would save the transaction.
3' Leibovicki, 57 Misc. 2d at 143-44, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
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the receipt or payment of interest.3 2 Moreover, no executed permissible venture document was ever submitted to the court.3 3
At the time of the transaction the charging of ten percent
annual interest on a loan would, under applicable New York law,
have been usurious. 34 The court stated that an "[i]ntent to over35
charge is an essential and necessary element of usury."
Although the permissible venture agreement was not part of the
record, the court found that references to the permissible venture in the parties' agreement and in a subsequent letter were
"helpful in arriving at the intention of the parties." ' 36 In concluding that the transaction was not usurious, the court held "that an
investment . . in the nature of a joint venture is not converted
into a loan of money, and therefore usurious, by the fact that one
parts guarantees the other against loss . . .and that his profits
shall amount to a certain sum." ' 37 Thus, the court, at least arguably, treated the relationship between the parties as a joint
venture.
Although a version of a permissible venture agreement
which had been proposed by one of the parties was presented to
the court, the court noted that the document had not been
signed by the other party and treated it as non-binding. The
court neither identified, nor addressed the significance of the
terms typical of permissible ventures such as the presumption of
profits, the elevated substantive and procedural burden of proof
32 Id. at 144-45, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. The agreement provided that "[t]his
agreement is drawn according to, and with the full understanding of the hetter isske,
which forbids the acceptance or the payment of interest." Id. at 142, 290 N.Y.S.2d
at 999. The agreement also characterized the venture as a profit sharing arrangement. Id.
33 Id. at 144, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. There was testimony, however, that subsequent to the advancement of funds, the Recipient wrote to the Financier mentioning that no permissible venture document had been executed and enclosing one for
his signature. Id. No proof was offered to establish that the agreement was signed.
Id.
34 Id. at 144, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02.
35 Id., 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (citations omitted).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 145, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (citing Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N.Y. 657, 661-62,
52 N.E. 690, 691-92 (1899)).
38 J.BLEICH, supra note 9, at 381, relies on this case for the conclusion that civil
courts have recognized permissible ventures as bona fide partnerships. In fact,
Leibovicki may not support that conclusion. At one point in its opinion, the court
simply stated that it was not usury for a lender to receive a share of profits in lieu of
interest. Leibovicki, 57 Misc. 2d at 144-45, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Consequently, the court's ruling arguably did not depend upon
whether the permissible venture in question was a partnership or a loan.
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required to rebut this presumption and to prove losses, and the
Recipient's requirement to repay all monies advanced by the Financier on a specified date, net of any pro rata losses. Yet these
are precisely the terms which manifest the parties' intention that
the permissible venture be the functional equivalent of a loan.
Consequently, the Leibovicki result appears to be a poor basis for
predictions regarding future cases.
Recently in Bollag v. Dresdner,"9 the court considered a case
where the Financier gave the Recipient $15,000 to be used for
business purposes.4" Soon thereafter, the parties signed a permissible venture agreement which stipulated the amount, the
terms and the conditions of the arrangement. 4 ' The agreement
stated that the Recipient received $15,000 for a business investment from which the Recipient would share his profit with the
Financier. 4 2 The court concluded that substance, not form, controlled the characterization of the venture, noting that "[a] transaction must be considered in its totality and judged by its real
character, rather than by the name, color, or form which the par'4
ties assign to it. 1
In reaching its conclusion, the Bollag court weighed various
complicating factors.4 4 For example, the Financier testified at
trial that, despite the express terms of the permissible venture to
the contrary, he did not agree to share in the Recipient's losses.4 5
He also maintained that the Recipient was unconditionally obligated to repay the principal amount.4 6 In addition, a rabbi who
was called as an expert witness on Jewish law testified for the Fin130 Misc. 2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 561. The Recipient claimed that he borrowed the
funds on behalf of a third party, his employer, Elco Elevator Co., with the Financier's knowledge and consent. Id. The Financier denied any knowledge that the
money was being borrowed for a particular company, but knew that the Recipient
was in the elevator business and admitted knowing that the Recipient would build
elevators with the money. Id. at 225, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
41 Id. at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 561. The permissible venture stated that the loan
was to be for six months with the Financier receiving a profit of 24% per month. Id.
At the time of the transaction, the maximum lawful annual interest rate was 10.5%.
Id. at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 562 (citations omitted). When the Financier sought to
have the agreement enforced the Recipient attempted to have the transaction
voided as usurious. Id. at 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
42 Id. at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 562. The permissible venture agreement which
was signed by the parties was written in Hebrew and translated for the court by an
official court interpreter. Id. at 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
43 Id. at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63.
44 Id. at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
45 Id.
39

40

46 Id.
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ancier that the permissible venture did not create a partnership.4 7
The court concluded, based on an analysis of the substantive
terms of the permissible venture "as interpreted by the parties
and their witnesses," that the transaction was a loan, not an investment.4 8 The court may have ruled differently had the testimony supported the explicit content of the permissible venture
agreement.
It is apparent that parties cannot reasonably proceed on the
assumption that, irrespective of the precise terms contained
within the applicable documentation and the substance of any
discussions between the parties, a court will treat a permissible
venture as a loan.
B.

Pitfalls from Treatment as a Partnership

A permissible venture's treatment as a partnership, rather
than a loan, has a number of adverse ramifications for the Financier and the Recipient.4 9
1. Joint and Several Liability
Partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership obligations.50 This liability attaches even to persons not known by
the creditor to have been a partner 5 ' and to silent partners who
exercise no control over the partnership business. 5 2 If secular
47 Id. At trial, "Rabbi Singer testified emphatically . . . that the agreement did
not create a joint venture or partnership." Id. The court did not elaborate on the
specific statements made by Rabbi Singer. It may well be that Rabbi Singer meant
no more than that, as a matter of substance, the permissible venture agreement was
not intended to create what he believed was a secular partnership. From the court's
opinion it is not clear whether the expert agreed with the Financier's contention
that the Recipient was unconditionally responsible for the return of the principal.
48 Id. at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
49 Some technical aspects of the permissible venture may cause additional
problems not separately discussed in the text. Because Jewish law does not recognize a partnership as a discrete entity, fractional title to partnership property is
vested in each of the partners according to their respective interest. Many permissible ventures expressly provide for this vesting of title. At the end of the term
specified in the permissible venture, the Recipient returns the Financier's investment (minus a pro rata share of any losses) and acquires title to all of the venture's
property. Consummation of this purchase might require recorded documentation
and might trigger transfer taxes, depending on applicable state law.
50 Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892); Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 445
A.2d 453 (1982); Houston General Ins. Co. v. Maples, 375 So.2d 1012 (Miss.
1979).
51 See Schwaegler Co. v. Marchesotti, 88 Cal. App. 2d 738, 199 P.2d 331 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
52 Dinkelspeel v. Lewis, 50 Wyo. 380, 62 P.2d 294 (1936), reh'g denied, 50 Wyo.
408, 65 P.2d 246 (1937); Schwaegler, 88 Cal. App. 2d at 335, 199 P.2d at 334-35.
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law finds that the permissible venture is a partnership, the Financier will be held jointly and severally liable for the liabilities of
the business conducted by the Recipient.5 3
In addition, the Financier could not necessarily protect himself from joint and several liability as a partner by simply adding
to the permissible venture a clause stating that his liability would
be limited to the amount of. the Financier's investment.5 4 It
seems well-established in secular law that "if such an intent exists
[to do those things which constitute a partnership] the parties
will be [considered] partners notwithstanding that they proposed
to avoid the liability attaching to partners, or have even expressly
stipulated 55in their agreement that they were not to become
partners.
The Financier could not avoid potential classification as a
partner by obtaining an indemnification and hold harmless
Conversely, both the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act contain provisions which shield a person from liability as a
general partner when he erroneously believed that he became a limited partner in a
limited partnership. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 11, 6 U.L.A. 594
(1969); REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 304(a), 6 U.L.A. 297 (1989).
53 Consequently, if the Recipient's business fails and the Recipient files a petition for bankruptcy the Financier may be held personally liable to the Recipient's
creditors. Another problem arising in the bankruptcy setting involves claims which
the Financier might have against the Recipient. The Financier would have an unsecured creditor's claim to recover the money loaned to the Recipient. In addition,
the funds invested by the Financier would have an equity interest, subordinate to
the claims of all creditors of equivalent rank.
Moreover, if the Recipient's trucks cause an accident and inflict injury, the Financier may be held liable. If the Recipient's products are defective and cause damage, the Financier may have to pay. If the Recipient invests in real estate which
turns out to be a toxic waste dump-site, the Financier may be obligated to expend
millions of dollars in clean-up costs. If the Recipient's facilities expose employees
to dangerous substances, like asbestos, the Financier may face an insurmountable
liability thirty years later. Because there is no end to the examples of the Financier's exposure, this problem is clearly the most serious which might result from a
finding that a permissible venture created a partnership.
54 The existence of a clause which attempts to limit the Financier's liability, however, may convince a court that a permissible venture arrangement did not create a
partnership.
55 Vohland v. Sweet, 433 N.E.2d 860, 864 (Ind. App. 1982) (citing Bacon v.
Christian, 184 Ind. 517, 111 N.E. 628 (1916)). See aLso Murphy v. Stevens, 645 P.2d
82 (Wyo. 1982) (partnership conduct is determinative); Randall Co. v. Briggs, 189
Minn. 175, 248 N.W. 752 (1933) (court examines specific partnership conduct);
Wyatt v. Brown, 39 Tenn. App. 28, 281 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) (intent to
do partnership acts establishes partnership); Claude v. Claude, 191 Or. 308, 228
P.2d 776, reh'g denied, 191 Or. 308, 230 P.2d 211 (1951) (partnership intent determined in light of total contract). There is an exception to liability arising out of
partnership contracts where the third party claimant had prior knowledge of the
restrictions agreed to by the partners. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 640 (1987).
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agreement from the Recipient for liability for any losses in excess
of the Financier's original investment in the partnership.5 6 The
Recipient simply may not have enough money to pay the entire
liability and no such agreement could bar third party claimants
from directly pursuing the Financier.5 7
2.

Federal Tax Consequences

A finding that a permissible venture has created a partnership may lead to unexpectedly large tax liabilities, denials of tax
deductions and tax reporting violations.
In 1984, an imputed interest provision was incorporated into
the federal tax code.5 8 Subject to exceptions not here pertinent,
this law applies to loans which are nominally interest-free treating the loans as if interest had been charged and collected by the
lender. The lender is therefore considered to have received taxable interest income. In the permissible venture agreement, half
of the funds advanced by the Financier are designated as an interest-free loan. If the imputed interest provision of the Internal
Revenue Code applies, the Financier may be treated as having
received imputed payments of taxable interest on that loan.
The periodic payments provided in the permissible venture
agreement are characterized as a return on the Financier's investment. Therefore, any excess over the amount invested may be
taxable either as investment profits or as payments in lieu of
profits. If a court treated the entire permissible venture as a disguised loan, the Financier's taxable income would probably be
limited to the excess of the investment imputing no additional
interest.5 9
56 For Jewish law purposes, the amount of the original investment must be at
risk. In the example used in Part II, supra, the amount at risk would equal one-half
of the total investment.
57 See, e.g., Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 619 (1892) (a partner cannot
insulate himself from creditors' claims through an agreement with his other partners); Mosely v. Commercial State Bank, 457 So.2d 967 (Ala. 1984) (newly admitted partner liable for debt existing prior to admission); Demas v. Convention Motor
Inns, 268 S.C. 186, 232 S.E.2d 724 (1977) (debt incurred in pursuit of partnership
is joint debt).
58 I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1988).
59 It is possible that a court could distinguish the interest-free loan portion of
the permissible venture from the investment element. As to the former, a court
could apply section 7872 and find imputed interest. As to the latter, the court
might find that in substance, if not form, it constituted an interest-bearing loan and
the Recipient's payments could be treated as taxable interest income. If a court
adopted this approach, the Financier could still be taxed on more money than he
received. This result, however, is logically unappealing. If a court were to apply a

1989]

PERMISSIBLE VENTURE

If a permissible venture were treated for tax purposes as a
valid partnership, the monies paid by the Recipient to the Financier would represent profits or a payment in lieu of profits, not
interest. Thus, if a Recipient obtains money from a bank pursuant to a permissible venture agreement, the money paid by the
Recipient might not be deductible as payment of interest. 60 Because the ability to deduct interest payments is a critical factor in
financial planning, the impact of this possible pitfall would be
significant.
Moreover, lending institutions are customarily required to
record and report to federal and state taxing authorities the
amount of interest paid to their customers. A holding that permissible ventures constitute partnerships may imply that some
institutions have improperly reported partnership profits as
interest.
3.

Proscribed Activities

If permissible ventures are deemed partnerships, lending institutions which participate in them may also be found to have
violated various laws or contractual obligations. For example,
many banks and savings and loan associations are prohibited
under state law, 6 ' federal law, 62 and/or agreements with the Fedsubstance rather than form analysis, it should do so to the entire permissible venture transaction and reach the conclusion that the money received from the Recipient represented interest on all of the monies advanced by the Financier.
60 If the payments are made pursuant to the presumptions in the permissible
venture agreement, the payments might be perceived as a further investment by the
Recipient to purchase the Financier's share of profits.
61 State lending institutions are ordinarily the creatures of statutes and they are
often deemed to be excluded from any activities not authorized by such statutes.
See State Bank of Blue Island v. Benzing, 383 Ill. 40, 48 N.E.2d 333 (1943); Nassau
Bank v. Jones, 95 N.Y. 115 (1884); 9 CAL. JUR. III Banks § 37 (1974). These restrictions would forbid institutional lenders from participating as a partner in particular
types of businesses.
In other states, lenders may be precluded from entering into any type of partnership arrangement. Marine Bank of Chicago v. Ogden, 29 I1. 248 (1862); Home
State Bank v. Vandolals, 188 III. App. 123 (1914); Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v.
Reynolds, 127 La. 193, 53 So. 520 (1910).
Where lenders are precluded from entering into a partnership arrangement,
joint ventures are distinguished from partnerships. Although it is difficult to delineate between the two types of entities, a joint venture is often found to exist when
two or more parties join for an extremely limited purpose. States generally allow a
lender to participate in joint ventures. Annotation, Corporations Power to Enter Into
PartnershiporJoint Venture, 60 A.L.R.2d 917 (1958).
62 National banking associations, for example, are restricted to the purposes for
which they may acquire, hold or lease real property. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1989). National banks are also generally prohibited from participating in partnerships.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:77

eral Deposit Insurance Corporation6 3 from entering into partnerships or engaging in the types of businesses which are commonly
pursued by the Recipients.
4.

Deposit Insurance

Another potential pitfall arises when a lending institution is
the Recipient and the Financier opens a savings account with a
bank. It is unclear whether the entire amount deposited will be
entitled to Federal Deposit Insurance or Federal Savings and
Loan Deposit Insurance. When a depositor makes an ordinary
deposit, he loans the entire amount to the depositee. 6 Under a
permissible venture, half of the money deposited is an investment by the depositor and not a loan. It is possible that the
aforesaid insurance policies would not protect depositor
investments.
5.

Securities Laws

Various federal and state securities laws and regulations require reporting and disclosure regarding an entity's financial status. A Financier to whom these requirements apply will be
obligated to determine how to characterize the monies advanced
to the Recipient. In addition, the Financier must decide whether
to disclose its potential liability as a partner or to refer to any of
the other possible problems discussed in the preceding sub-sections of this Part III.
IV.

ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR TREATING THE PERMISSIBLE
VENTURE AS A LOAN

A.

Possibility of an Allowable Religious Accommodation

An initial question is whether the religious motivation for
the permissible venture warrants special treatment. In other
words, should secular law offer a permissible accommodation 6 5
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906); First Nat. Bank v. Stokes,
134 Ark. 368, 203 S.W. 1026 (1918).
63 FDIC, MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, § U (1979).
64 See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) ("relationship of bank
and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract").
65 This concept is distinguishable from the principles of mandatory accommodation which state that when government has infringed a free exercise right, government must accommodate the right unless it is outweighed by a compelling and
narrowly tailored state interest. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, reh 'g denied,

466 U.S. 994 (1984).
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to Jewish religious interests and treat the permissible venture as a
loan rather than as a partnership?
The permissible venture developed within Jewish law as a
substitute for express loans. Historically, Jewish communities
were relatively insular, separated from their Gentile neighbors.
They were governed by rabbinic courts which applied Jewish law.
Jewish law permitted a person to form a partnership while restricting his liability for the acts undertaken by his partnership.
Similarly, Jewish law did not recognize the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Nor were there regulations restricting the business operations of individual or group money-lenders or special tax
treatment for interest income or expenses. In short, the pitfalls
of partnership status described above do not exist within the Jewish law system.
Potential problems arise in transferring this religious law
mechanism from its original historical and legal context into the
current secular legal framework. The risks which inure from
characterization as a partnership would tend to discourage or
heavily burden the use of permissible ventures. Ajudicial or legislative response, reducing the probability of partnership characterization, would encourage investment and accommodate Jewish
religious concerns. The courts have long recognized that government may take certain acts to accommodate religious interests. 6 6 The parameters of an allowable accommodation are
broader than the scope of noninterference mandated by the free
exercise clause. 67 Nonetheless, because the adoption of accommodating measures is peculiarly a matter of public policy, it is the
proper subject, in the first instance,6 8 for the legislature, not the
66 For discussions regarding the accommodation of religious rights & Adams &
Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 37 DE
PAUL L. REV. 317, 319 (1988); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(1985); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J.
692 (1968); Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get
Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147 (1987).
67 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987);
Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
68 The judiciary may be called upon to evaluate whether a specific accommodation made by a particular branch of government is constitutional or whether an
additional accommodation, in a particular case, is mandated. Nevertheless, it
seems inappropriate for the judiciary to fashion a substantive law accommodation.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:77

judiciary. Assuming for the moment that there were no legal
grounds for characterizing the permissible venture as a loan,
there would be no authority for the judiciary to label it so.
Indeed, even the legislature may not transform a permissible
venture which is really a partnership into a loan merely by declaring it to be one. Nonetheless, appropriately drafted legislation
could protect Financiers from particular pitfalls. State law
problems might dissipate, for example, if the legislature would
(1) recognize the permissible venture as establishing a limited
partnership,6 9 (2) authorize lenders to participate in permissible
venture limited partnerships, (3) provide that such limited partnerships are valid immediately upon the execution of a permissible venture agreement, either without a recording requirement
or contingent upon subsequent recordation, and (4) specify the
tax treatment applicable to the various aspects of permissible
venture transactions. Of course, these measures could be challenged for going beyond the pale of allowable accommodation
and representing an unconstitutional fostering of religion. 70 The
permissible venture, however, is neither a religious document,
nor a religious ritual. Moreover, any legislation would arguably
have the secular purpose of affordingJewish borrowers the same
type 7 ' of access to financing as non-Jews enjoy. These measures
might also be structured to permit similar relief to transactions
between non-Jews which were established in a permissible venture format.
Even if the regulations pass constitutional muster, legislative
efforts by a single authority may be frustrated by permissible ventures which involve the laws, rules or regulations of various auOf course, courts do sometimes accommodate religious litigants or counsel with
respect to procedural matters such as scheduling.
69 To avoid having decisions depend upon judicial construction of the terms of
particular permissible venture agreements, the legislature might adopt a per se rule
treating all documents as a loan which are labelled "permissible venture" or which
declare themselves to be a permissible venture according to the particular statute.
Alternatively, the legislature could recognize a particular form of permissible ven-

ture agreement as constituting a secular loan. For Jewish law purposes, however,
the legislature must also enforce the particular provisions of the agreement regarding the Recipient's ability to rebut the presumptions of profitability.
70 If, for instance, banks were otherwise precluded from participating in partnerships, a law enabling them to enter into permissible venture limited partnerships
might be challenged as promoting religion.
71 Opponents would presumably contend that the same type of financing is presently available from non-Jews. Alternatively, opponents might argue that permissible venture agreements, because of the possibility of participation in profits and
losses, would not in fact be the same type of financing.
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thorities. Therefore, it is important to decide whether, without
new rules or laws, a permissible venture establishes a secular
partnership.
B.

Permissible Ventures Lack Essential Partnership Criteria

The permissible venture was designed as a legal fiction.
Although it resembles a partnership, it is in effect a disguised
loan. The sticking point is that there is a possibility, albeit attenuated and remote, that the venture's form will have substantive
significance whereby the Financier will actually participate in the
profits and losses of the permissible venture business, rather than
to merely receive scheduled payments. Ultimately, I contend,
that for reasons set forth below this possibility is de minimis and
should not affect the conclusion that the permissible venture is
essentially a loan, not a partnership. Case law generally supports
the proposition that whether parties are partners depends on the
substance of their relationship rather than on the label they give
to it.7" The elements that truly mark a partnership are not formally or substantially present in permissive ventures. Consequently, courts reviewing a permissible venture should conclude
that it is a loan, not a partnership.
1.

Partnership Criteria

Five features are commonly regarded as highly probative of
the existence of a partnership:
(1) The parties must intend to create a partnership. It is,
however, unnecessary for the parties to have understood that the
legal impact of their contract was to establish a partnership.73
Nor is it essential that they foresaw all of the legal consequences
attendant on the formation of a partnership. It is enough that
the parties intended to agree to the terms of their contract and
72 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania may be the exception
that proves the rule. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accorded weight to a
declaration by contracting parties that their arrangement was not a partnership.
Kingsley Clothing Mfg. Co. v.Jacobs, 344 Pa. 551, 555, 26 A.2d 315, 317 (1942). A
subsequent Pennsylvania Superior Court additionally enforced the declaration
against a third-party creditor even where the contracting parties were sharing both
profits and losses from the business activity. Rosenberger v. Herbst, 210 Pa. Super.
127, 130-32, 232 A.2d 634, 636-37 (Super. Ct. 1967). Interestingly, in commenting on these two cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
not only remarked that it would be inequitable for the parties' declaration to affect
the rights of third parties, but also concluded that there had been no such effect. In
re PCH Assoc., 804 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1986).
73 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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that, as a matter of law, those terms were sufficient to establish a
74
partnership.
(2) To establish a partnership, the parties must engage in a
profit-seeking commercial enterprise.
(3) Each of the parties must own a proprietary interest in the
partnership business itself.
(4) The partners must share in the profits of the business.
This component is a necessary condition, albeit not sufficient to
constitute a partnership. The sharing must be based on the parties' co-ownership of the partnership business. 75 Thus, although
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) provides that the sharing of
profits is generally primafacieevidence of a partnership, an exception exists if the profits are received "[a]s interest on a loan,
though the amount of payment var[ies] with the profits of the
business. "76
(5) Another requisite element of a partnership is that the
parties must be at risk in the event that the partnership sustains
losses.7 7
2.

Formal or Substantive Lack of Criteria

The substance of a permissible venture, not merely its formal elements, must be explored to determine if it constitutes a
partnership. A few introductory remarks regarding the substance
versus form approach are in order.
i.

GeneralApproach

Courts frequently search beneath the superficial forms of
legal entities or transactions to ascertain the form's true, or substantive nature. In some instances, this approach may be legislatively prescribed.78 In the alternative, courts have justified this
74 See, e.g., Randall Co. v. Briggs, 189 Minn. 175, 248 N.W. 752 (1933) (an
agreement among partners may establish the partnership); Claude v. Claude, 191
Or. 308, 228 P.2d 776, 783, reh'g denied, 191 Or. 308, 20 P.2d 211 (1951) (although
an agreement was designated as a property settlement agreement by the parties, it
was deemed a partnership agreement by the court).
75 Oshatz v. Goltz, 55 Or. App. 173, 637 P.2d 628, 629 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) ("A
mere community of interest, such as the right to share in profits ... does not make
one a partner; the right to share in profits must result from part ownership of the

business.").
76 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4)(d), 6 U.L.A. 38 (1969).
77 Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 133 N.J.L. 295, 44 A.2d
172, 174 (E. & A. 1945).
78 See, e.g., In re Opelika Mfg. Corp., 67 B.R. 169, 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)
(citations omitted) (Georgia Commercial Code required case by case determination
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approach on equitable or policy grounds.7 9
The inquiry into the substance of a transaction is often
phrased as an effort to discern the parties' true intent. There is a
probing evaluation of the parties subjective understanding of the
transaction. If the formal partnership is only a smokescreen and
the parties intended an altogether different relationship, such as
a debtor-creditor relationship, the partnership form may be
disregarded. 8 0
Even if a permissible venture stated that the Financier and
the Recipient will pursue a partnership or joint venture, this language should not be dispositive as to the parties' intent. As mentioned above, these terms may only reflect a rabbi's inelegant
efforts to translate into English the Hebrew term shutfus.
Furthermore, certain permissible ventures, such as those
used for consumer financing, are surely not partnerships. Because a permissible venture agreement accommodates at least
some non-partnership arrangements, it cannot be said that execution of a permissible venture, 1 universally reflects an intention
8
to create a secular partnership.
of whether a lease was intended as security); In re PCH Assoc., 804 F.2d 193 (2d
Cir. 1986) (legislative history indicates that Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code was intended to apply only to true leases).
79 For example, although mortgages frequently proport to convey to creditors
legal title, courts have historically treated them as establishing mere liens.
80 See, e.g., In re Washington Communications Group, Inc., 18 B.R. 437 (Bankr.
D.C. 1982) (use of a partnership agreement to establish a tax shelter will not create
a partnership if the prerequisites of a partnership are not present); Skaar v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 61 Wis. 2d 93, 211 N.W.2d 642 (1973) (examining elements of a
partnership), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 133 N.J.L. 295, 44 A.2d 172 (E. & A. 1945) (profit-sharing agreement not conclusive of partnership); Preston v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 174
Or. 553, 149 P.2d 957 (1944) (the parties' conduct toward a business venture determines whether they established a partnership or a partnership contract);
Chaiken v. Employment Security Comm'n, 274 A.2d 707 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971)
(intent to distribute profits is an indispensable requirement of partnership). See also
supra note 55 (where a partnership relationship exists the court will disregard
agreements to the contrary).
81 In attempting to fathom the true intent of the parties, courts will consider
factors including the parties' subjective goals, the parties expectations, the negotiations between the parties, the parties' statements concerning their relationship, the
parties' conduct and the economic effect of the transaction. See, e.g., In re Washington Communications Group, Inc., 18 B.R. 437 (Bankr. D.C. 1982) (creditor does
not become partner by receiving percentage of profits); In re Opelika Mfg. Corp.,
67 B.R. 169 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (disguised security agreement between debtor
and creditor renders bankruptcy code inapplicable); In re Nite Lite Inns, 13 B.R.
900 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (implicitly held that the same criteria may be applied in
determining if a sale-leaseback is bona fide irrespective of whether the context of
the inquiry is state usury law or federal tax law).
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Consumer Financing Ventures Lack PartnershipCriteria

ManyJewish law authorities allow the use of permissible venture agreements even where the Recipient is not engaged in a
commercial activity but seeks only the equivalent of a consumer
loan.82 There are several reasons, in addition to those set forth
below regarding commercial ventures, why these arrangements
fail to constitute secular partnerships. Consumer financing ventures do not involve the carrying-on of a business for profit, the
parties are not co-owners of a partnership business and they do
not truly share in the profits and losses of such a business.
A majority of Jewish law authorities allow the use of a permissible venture for a consumer purpose provided that the Recipient is also involved in some business enterprise. 83 The
permissible venture financing theoretically permits the Recipient
to continue his business activity without liquidating the capital
previously dedicated to it. Secular law does not seem to contain
any mechanism by which to classify the arrangement and thereby
find that the permissible venture established a partnership
business.
iii.

Commercial Ventures Lack PartnershipCriteria

Commercial permissible ventures involve, at most, a conditional sharing of profits and losses. Even when used to directly
fund a business activity, permissible venture agreements may not
82 One proposed justification is that in order to avoid paying the profit presumed by the permissible venture document, the Recipient must in any event take
an oath. By making the scheduled payments to avoid taking the oath, he is not
regarded as paying interest. See S. SCHWADRON, TESHUVOT MAHARSHAM, II, 216.
The carrying-on of a partnership business, however, would not be for profit.
83 It is argued that the Recipient's employment was a profit-making activity and
the advancement of funds which permitted the activity to continue constituted a
business venture. Another explanation was advanced where, but for the loan, the
Recipient would have been forced to abandon his employment and seek a higher

paying position. SeeJ. NATHANSON, TESHUVOT SHO'EL U-MESHIV, I, 3-160. It is diffi-

cult to believe that a secular court would characterize the continued employment of
the Recipient by a third party as the carrying-on of a partnership business. Indeed,
many, perhaps most, Jewish law authorities do not view an arrangement as a business venture. See, e.g., M. FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah, II, 62; M. ARAK,
TESHUVOT IMREI YOSHER, I, 108; A. HALEVI, GINAT VERADIM, Yoreh Deah, kal 6, 4;
S. ZALMAN, SHULKHAN ARUKH HA-RAv, Hilkhot Ribbit, § 42; S. GANZFRIED, KITSUR
SHULKHAN ARUKH, 66:10.
If such an arrangement would be treated by secular law as a partnership, new
problems might arise where the money was provided to a professional, like an asso-

ciate in a law firm, by someone who is not licensed to practice in that profession.
Often there are rules which forbid a licensed professional from entering into a partnership with a non-licensed individual.
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in substance require the sharing of profits and losses. Given the
presumptions set forth in the agreement, the permissible venture
requires, in effect, the Recipient to make the scheduled payments
unrelated to the actual profits and losses of the business. This
obligation remains in effect until and unless the Recipient satisfies certain conditions regarding the proof of profits.84 Thus,
even if the Financier's mere participation in profits proves the
existence of a partnership, the permissible venture agreement
represents no more than an agreement permitting the Recipient
the right to establish such a partnership in the future.
For example, consider a case in which A advances money to
B for use in a business operated by B. A and B agree that if A
rolls snake-eyes twelve times in a row, A and B will share equally
in the profits from the business. If A's dice do not cooperate,
however, A will simply get a twelve percent annual return on the
investment. Because A will not participate in the profits until and
unless the dice roll a certain way, it appears that there is no partnership until and unless the dice so fall. In the meantime, the
arrangement could be characterized as a partnership subject to a
condition precedent.8 5 Provided that the Recipient does not actually prove profits or losses, no partnership would ever be established.86 The same principle applies to a permissible venture.
Until and unless the Recipient proves actual profits or losses by
the evidentiary standards of the permissible venture agreement,
the Financier will merely receive a fixed return on the investment
and no partnership will be formed.
Neither of the two apparent objections to this analysis is persuasive. Contrary to the condition precedent argument, one
might contend that the permissible venture agreement created a
partnership subject to a condition subsequent. Yet, this characterization seems artificial and inapt. Given the presumptions of
the permissible venture agreement, there is no initial sharing of
profits and losses. Only the Recipient's affirmative act could create this sharing. The more natural view is that there is no part84 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (the Recipient must prove the
amount of profits, or the absence of profits, through a solemn oath).
85 Cf. Moore v. Walton, 17 F. Cas. 708 (N.D. Miss. 1874) (No. 9,779) (where
agreement merely conferred upon a lender the option to receive a share of the
borrower's net profits in lieu of interest, only an executory contract for a partnership was formed).
86 Of course, according to this particular part of my analysis, taken independently, if a Recipient proved profits and losses, a partnership relationship could
exist.
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nership until and unless such an affirmative act is performed.
Moreover, whereas the condition precedent argument refers to
the Recipient's act as the operative condition, the condition subsequent alternative awkwardly refers to a passive development,
the Recipient's failure to act, as the condition. In any event, this
objection is of limited significance. It is highly likely that the Recipient will fail to provide the requisite proof of the venture's
profits. Consequently, the Financier would never share in the
profits and losses and at no time would a partnership exist.
Another objection might be that the bringing of proof is not
a condition at all but, rather, an inherent and integral element of
any legal relationship. Here, the contention might continue, the
parties simply agreed that only a particular level of proof would
be acceptable. This is an easy argument to state, but there seems
to be no authority which has declared that the need to satisfy a
consensual requirement, even one pertaining to the level of
proof, cannot also be deemed a condition, particularly where the
standards of proof are so significantly in excess of those generally
applicable under secular law.
As a matter of substance, the permissible venture does not
involve the sharing of profits and losses. In many contexts it is
practically, and in some cases perhaps even theoretically, 7 impossible to establish profits and losses. In no case is there more
than a remote probability that a Recipient will agree to take the
requisite oath or be able to adduce the necessary witnesses.
Where the Recipient is engaged in many business activities,
he must be prepared to offer competent testimony on the profitability of each. 8 Moreover, permissible ventures may be of very
brief duration in situations where, for example, the Recipient has
the need for short-range, immediate financing, or financing on a
particular piece of equipment. These limitations may make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine the amount of
profits or losses directly attributable to the permissible venture.8 9
87 A theoretical impossibility of calculation, however, could pose a problem
from a Jewish law perspective because Jewish law requires that there be a possibility
that the permissible venture would have an enforceable substantive effect unlike

that of a loan.
88 In a permissible venture, if the investment was made in the activity which was
in fact most profitable, the investment activity will not be identified until after the
venture terminates. At that time, it will be too late to arrange for witnesses.
89 Factors including increased good will, for instance, are not easily ascertainable, particularly where the temporal scope of the inquiry may be severely circumscribed.

Permissible ventures for the purchase of particular pieces of equipment also
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Permissible ventures involving short-term financing during the
start-up period of a business where a negative cash-flow is anticipated, would involve equally complex questions regarding the
determination of profits.
Several commentators have stated that the relevant restrictions render the loss-sharing provisions of the permissible venture nugatory.9 0 What remains is the Financier's right to receive
and the Recipient's virtually unconditional obligation to pay the
amount set forth in the permissible venture agreement.
Even if the permissible venture involved the sharing of
losses, the type of loss-sharing would not be typical to a partnership." Ordinarily, partners agree to unlimited exposure for
partnership losses. By contrast, a Financier in a permissible venture agrees to risk only the amount of his investment, 9 2 and he
accepts no personal liability.9 3
Nevertheless, case law suggests that the limited liability of a
Financier will not preclude him from partner status. A party providing funds to a business and sharing in its profits will be treated
as a partner if the obligation to repay the funds advanced depends upon the success or failure of the business.9 4 Once the
repayment obligation is conditioned on obtaining profits, any
pose conceptual problems in defining the permissible venture business. One might
argue that the venture is to rent the purchased property to the Recipient for use in
his preexisting business. Alternatively, one could contend that it is an enterprise to
participate, as a partner, in the Recipient's preexisting business. The fact that the
permissible venture agreement does not specify the nature of the business may
make it impossible to determine profits and losses. It is not clear that a rabbinic or
secular court would supply the missing material term.
90 M. ELON, supra note 23, at 504; G. HOROWITZ, supra note 23.
91 See Feder, "Either a Partneror a Lender Be". Emerging Tax Issues in Real Estate
Finance, 36 TAX LAWYER 191, 204 (1983).
92 This is the case if the permissible venture agreement is properly prepared.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (restrictions on liability are seldom included in the permissible venture agreement).
93 Of course, if a court finds that the other features of a permissible venture are
sufficient to constitute a partnership, the court could rule that, as a matter of law,
the Financier was unlimitedly liable as a partner. Nonetheless, the fact that the
parties expressly restrict the Financier's liability is relevant to the parties' intent.
94 See, e.g., Buford v. Lewis, 87 Ark. 412, 112 S.W. 963 (1908) (sharing of business profits is an element in establishing a partnership relationship when assessing
third party rights); Dubos v. Jones, 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. 392 (1894) (a lender who
shares in the profits of the debtor's business in exchange of interest will be liable to
third parties if the third party is misled into believing that a partnership existed);
Southern Fertilizer Co. v. Reams, 105 N.C. 283, 11 S.E. 467 (1890) (the fact that a
partner is paid interest by the partnership in consideration of capital contribution
will not change the parties relationship to that of debtor/creditor); Dinkelspeel v.
Lewis, 50 Wyo. 380, 62 P.2d 294 (1936), reh'g denied, 50 Wyo. 408, 65 P.2d 246
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agreement between the parties to limit the liability of the Finan95
cier is ineffective as to third parties as a matter of law.
Additionally, most permissible ventures do not involve any
meaningful co-ownership of the venture's business. The Financier generally possesses no control over the business. The lack of
control, although permitted by the UPA, has been considered evidence of the absence of a partnership. 96 In some instances, the
Financier may be entirely unaware of the use to which his money
is put. Some permissible venture agreements provide that the
investment is deemed to have been made in the commercial activity of the Recipient which was most profitable during the term
of the venture. Thus, the use first becomes identifiable after the
venture terminates and when it is possible to ascertain the profitability of the Recipient's various activities. Surely it strains logic
to state that, during the term of such a permissible venture, the
Financier meaningfully co-owned the venture's unidentifiable
business.
Nor is the Financier automatically entitled to participate in
the profitable operations of the business. During the venture,
the Recipient can avoid the Financier's participation by merely
making the scheduled payments set forth in the permissible venture agreement. When the venture terminates, the Recipient is
entitled to buy out the Financier's purported ownership interest
for an amount equal to the Financier's original investment, less
the Financier's pro rata share of any loss. The Recipient can repurchase the Financier's interest even if the fair market value of
(1937) (a creditor who is compensated through business profits in a manner which

establishes a community of profits will be treated as a partner).
The language of these decisions generally suggested that there might be spe-

cial circumstances which could result in a finding that there was no partnership. See
supra text at III, B (identifying special circumstances).
There is no valid policy justification for these precedents even where, in substance as well as form, the obligation to repay is conditional. The rule of these
cases surely should not be extended and applied to a permissible venture, which is
clearly a partial loan, that the Recipient is unconditionally obligated to repay.
Viewing the two parts of the venture arrangement together, a court should con-

clude that a permissible venture is distinguishable from a partnership which attempts to limit liability.

95 But see Kingsley Clothing Mfg. Co. v.Jacobs, 344 Pa. 551, 26 A.2d 315 (1942)
discussed supra note 72.
96 See, e.g., Chocknok v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 696 P.2d
669 (Alaska 1985) (extent of spouse's participation in family business is an element
in considering the existence of a co-ownership relationship); Commonwealth v.
Southeastern Iron Corp., 142 Va. 107, 128 S.E. 528 (Va. Ct. App. 1925) (lack of

community interest in and over business and property may prevent existence of
partnership).
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the Financier's ownership interest is far greater than the Financier's original investment. Upon paying the Financier, the Recipient may retain all of the hard assets of the venture and may
continue the business for his own benefit. In effect, the Recipient
97
merely repays the principal loaned by the Financier.
The entire circumstantial framework of a permissible venture tends to establish that the parties sought and established the
equivalent of a secular loan arrangement. The fixed schedule of
payments set forth in the permissible venture embodies a definite
rate of return on the aggregate funds that the Financier advanced. Therefore, the Financier cannot be motivated by the
possibility of earning a higher return on the investment because
the Recipient, by refusing to take an oath or bring witnesses, can
force the Financier to accept the fixed payments. Moreover, the
Recipient cannot be motivated by the hope that the Financier will
receive less than the fixed payout. The likelihood of successfully
proving profits and losses would not even warrant the expense of
the necessary preparatory steps, such as maintaining adequate
bookkeeping9 8 and ensuring the presence of qualified Jewish
witnesses.
The negotiations between the parties typically reflect their
expectation of a fixed rate of return. The parties often do not
focus on the details or the profitability of the Recipient's business, but on the Recipient's ability to make the fixed schedule of
payments set forth in the permissible venture. Because the nature of the venture business, assuming that the transaction actually involves a business, is not customarily specified, the parties
do not reach a firm understanding of the way in which the Recipient might actually prove the venture's profits or losses. Indeed,
the parties may not even discuss the use of a permissible venture
until all of the economic parameters are agreed. These negotiations often refer to the interest rate which will be charged, causing one of the parties to mention that, for religious purposes, a
permissible venture agreement will be utilized. Moreover, Financiers often provide money for the start-up period of a business,
in which there is an expectation of cash-flow losses. The parties,
97 In conjunction with other restrictions placed on the Financier's rights during
the term of the agreement, the buy-out option ensures that the Financier does not
share in the venture's growth potential, further evidencing an intent not to form a
partnership.
98 Where, for example, the permissible venture is for a limited purpose within
the framework of an ongoing business, separate records would have to be kept on
the permissible venture business.
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therefore, anticipate receiving the fixed payments. In addition,
there may be no meaningful relationship between the actual
profit expected from the permissible venture business and the
rate of return contemplated in the payment schedule. 99 For example, where a Financier provided $100, $50 of which was a nointerest loan and $50 of which was an investment, the permissible
venture might contain a payment schedule representing a 20%
annual return, or $10, on the $50 invested. The permissible venture may declare that a profit of 20% or greater is expected but,
in fact, the Recipient will want to proceed with the permissible
venture transaction even if his expected profit is only between
10% and 20%. By utilizing a permissible venture agreement the
Recipient really received $100. The required payment of $10 actually reflects only a 10%, not a 20%, annual return on the total
amount provided by the Financier.
Furthermore, the purportedly interest-free loan component
of the transaction defies credibility. It is not the custom of average Financiers, especially institutional lenders, to make interestfree loans. Similarly, the fact that the Recipient receives only
nominal consideration for managing the permissible venture
business, ordinarily as little as one dollar, is hardly indicative of
meaningful negotiation between the parties.
In the permissible venture agreement, the presence of terms
which are uncharacteristic of a partnership,' 0 0 but which are permitted in a shutfus, further indicate the parties' intent not to form
a partnership. Of course, if a court finds for other reasons that a
partnership was formed, some of these restrictions might not be
enforceable. 01 Nevertheless, the fact that the parties intended to
include these terms may impact on the threshold question of
whether a partnership was established.
The economic impact of the permissible venture is almost
exactly the same as if the Financier had made an interest-bearing
loan to the Recipient. There is, however, the possibility of a different result if (1) the profitability of the business is less than the
interest rate implied by the payment schedule, (2) the profitability is susceptible to proof in the manner set forth in the permissible venture, and (3) it is practicable for the Recipient to provide
99 From the perspective of Jewish law, it is certainly better that there be a reasonable connection between the expected profits and the rate of return on the
funds invested by the Financier. Nevertheless, it is not clear what extent of an interrelationship is actually required.
100 See supra text at II, D (restrictions indicative of permissible ventures).
101 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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the necessary proof. The confluence of these three factors is extraordinarily unlikely because in reality the Recipient's obligation
to repay the monies furnished is essentially unconditional.
Courts have often disregarded the purported form of an entity or a transaction, even where the economic consequences of
the purported form would differ from the substantive form which
was recognized and enforced by the court. 0 2 A minority of
courts, however, have found that there was no partnership even
where the parties actually shared profits and losses. 0 3 Consequently, the fact that a permissible venture provides for the remote possibility of participation in the profits and the losses
should not prevent secular recognition of the transaction as a
loan.
iv.

Objections to Disregardingthe Alleged PartnershipForm

It is perhaps unusual to disregard the form which the parties
have elected, especially where the parties themselves ask for the
form to be disregarded. When courts follow substance rather
than form, they generally act in the interest of public policy and
over the protests of the parties involved. In the permissible venture context, however, the parties seek to provide financing for a
fee, while jivoiding a religious prohibition against interest. This
motive, without more, 0 4 would not offend legitimate public policies. In addition, it seems that even if a court disregards the partnership form in order to safeguard public policy, it should not
disregard the form for purposes unrelated to the policies.
An arguably better view, however, would establish the legal
relationship between the parties by their true intent which would
be evidenced by their conduct. Identification of an improper mo102 See Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. K & L Litho Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d.
697, 91 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1970). The court stated that "[i]n determining whether a
transaction constitutes a loan, the significant consideration is the substance of the
transaction rather than its form or the terminology used by the parties." Id. at 702,
91 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (quoting Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal.2d 983, 989, 80
Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 458 P.2d 185, 189 (1969)).
103 See, e.g., Freese v. United States, 455 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1972) (employee
who received percentage of profits is not a partner); Sutton v. Schaff, 104 Kan. 282,
178 P. 418 (1919) (the sharing of profits and losses is a principal, but not conclusive
test of partnership's existence); Rosenberger v. Herbst, 210 Pa. Super. 127, 232
A.2d 634 (Super. Ct. 1967) (although agreement provided for the sharing of profits
and losses, one party's full control of the business prevented the establishment of a

partnership).
104 if a particular permissible venture agreement would result in an effective interest rate, based on the entire sum advanced, in excess of that permitted under
applicable usury law, an improper motive might be found.
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tive should not be a sine qua non for piercing the parties' elected
form. Instead, a motive inconsistent with the purported transaction should be regarded simply as evidence that the substance of
the transaction in fact differs from the form adopted. There are
occasions where parties are entitled to benefit themselves
through the selection of a particular form. If they do not utilize
that form in its ordinary manner, or observe the practices customarily associated with it, then they should not be found to have
employed the form. The parties, however, might remain liable to
third parties on equitable grounds.' 1 5
Irrespective of the merits of this argument in general, courts
have held that substance rather than form should control when
determining whether a partnership exists.'" 6 Even if a permissible venture were perceived as imbued with the form of a partnership, in substance it should be recognized as a loan.
v.

Promotion of Public Policy

The characterization of a permissible venture as a secular
loan, rather than as a partnership would promote, not offend,
public policy. There is no significant public policy which would
require a permissible venture to expose the Financier to the joint
and several liability of a general partner. Secular law permits investors to accomplish the financial objectives of the Financier
without incurring personal liability. For example, these objectives may be achieved by a person who invests in a corporation's
common stock." 7 If there are business profits, he receives a proportion of the gain.' 08 If the business collapses, his loss is limited
to the amount of the investment. This is true even where the
investor, through use of voting rights, exercised actual control
105 Equitable estoppel may be employed to hold a party to a permissible venture
liable to a third party. In the context of a permissible venture, however, there is
little likelihood of third-party reliance on the existence of a partnership between
the Financier and Recipient. Further, the parties to the permissible venture agreement themselves do not perceive themselves as partners.
106 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
107 The exact objectives may not be obtained by every investor in a corporation's
common stock. For example, pursuant to the permissible venture, the Financier
may still want the accrued profits to be treated as interest. In a subchapter "S"
corporation, the distributed income may be treated as ordinary income, whereas in
non-subchapter "S" corporations, the income may be treated as a dividend.
Notwithstanding possible securities law complications, an investor could accomplish the financial objectives of a Financier in a permissible venture by purchasing
stock in a subchapter "S" corporation where there is only one other shareholder.
108 The gain may be realized actually, through a dividend distribution, or equitably through stock appreciation.
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over the corporation. The possibility that third parties dealing
with the corporation may mistakenly rely on the shareholders' financial status does not prevent this result.
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)' 019 provide vehicles for accomplishing, in the partnership context, what the
parties to a permissible venture desire. 110 In exchange for infusing capital into a business, a limited partner, with no right to
manage the venture, participates in the partnership's profits without being personally liable for its obligations. The ULPA and the
RULPA protect innocent third parties by requiring a public filing
to provide notice of the limited partnership. The ULPA and the
RULPA even provide a safety valve for persons who mistakenly
believed that they became limited partners in a limited partnership. The ULPA provides that a person who contributed capital
to a partnership and mistakenly believed that he became a limited
partner did not necessarily, by exercising the rights of a limited
partner, become a general partner or become bound by the debts
of the partnership." ' Therefore, the investor can avoid becoming a general partner by promptly renouncing his interest in the
partnership profits and in any other compensation from the partnership. A similar provision of the RULPA addresses a person
who made a contribution to a partnership but who, in good faith,
erroneously believed that he became a limited partner in a limited partnership." 2 The RULPA provides that the person, upon
6 U.L.A. 594 (1969); REVISED UNIFORM
6 U.L.A. 297 (1989).
110 This form may not be exactly what the parties to a permissible venture desire
because the limited partnership income is treated for tax purposes as partnership
profits, not as interest.
111 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 11, 6 U.L.A. 594 (1969). ULPA Section
11 states in its entirety:
A person who has contributed to the capital of a business conducted by
a person or partnership erroneously believing that he has become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of
the rights of a limited partner, a general partner with the person or in
the partnership carrying on the business, or bound by the obligations of
such person or partnership; provided that on ascertaining the mistake
he promptly renounces his interest in the profits of the business, or
other compensation by way of income.
Id.
112 REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 304(a), 6 U.L.A. 297 (1989).
RULPA section 304(a) states in its entirety that:
Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who makes a contribution
to a business enterprise and erroneously but in good faith believes that
he [or she] has become a limited partner in the enterprise is not a general partner in the enterprise and is not bound by its obligations by rea109 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT,

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT,
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learning his mistake, may avoid classification as a general partner
if he either promptly causes an appropriate certificate of limited
partnership or certificate of amendment to be filed or withdraws
from future equity participation in the business. The RULPA,' 13
however, does not apply to claims by third parties who transacted
business with the partnership believing in good faith, at the time
of the transaction, that the investor was a general partner.
The financial terms of a carefully drawn permissible venture
agreement closely resemble a limited partnership. Neither the
Financier, nor the Recipient perceive that the permissible venture is a general partnership under secular law and, as a result,
third parties rarely, if ever, learn about or rely upon the existence
of the permissible venture. It is, therefore, improbable that third
parties would detrimentally rely on the existence of a partnership
between the Financier and the Recipient.' 14 Absent proof of reliance in a particular case, there is no policy justification for contravening the parties' intent and treating them as if they were
general partners.
Restrictions on the activities of institutional lenders, whether
imposed by statute or by agreement are often the result of a concern to ensure the financial stability of banks. Participation in a
partnership, or in particular types of business activities, might be
barred as a matter of public policy where they involve undesirable risks.
son of making the contribution, receiving distributions from the
enterprise, or exercising any rights of a limited partner, if, on ascertaining the mistake, he [or she]:
(1) causes an appropriate certificate of limited partnership or a certificate of amendment to be executed and filed; or
(2) withdraws from future equity participation in the enterprise by
executing and filing in the office of the Secretary of State a certificate
declaring withdrawal under this section.
Id.
113 Id. at 304(b). Subsection (b) of RULPA section 304 provides for liability as a
general partner where:
A person who makes a contribution of the kind described in subsection
(a) is liable as a general partner to any third party who transacts business
with the enterprise (i) before the person withdraws and an appropriate
certificate is filed to show withdrawal, or (ii) before an appropriate certificate is filed to show that he [or she] is not a general partner, but in
either case only if the third party actually believed in good faith that the
person was a general partner at the time of the transaction.
Id.
114 Of course, if in a particular instance there is reasonable and detrimental reliance by a third party on the existence of a partnership arrangement, the general
rules of apparent liability might apply to protect them.
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If a permissible venture agreement does not create a secular
partnership, however, only the principal and the opportunity cost
of the loan is risked. Neither the amount at risk, nor the
probability of the risk is significantly different from the risk involved in ordinary loans. Every time a lender makes a loan, the
principal and the opportunity cost of the money is at risk. If a
borrower files in bankruptcy, for instance, a lender may recover
little or nothing at all.
The literal terms of the permissible venture agreement operate to increase the degree of risk as to the amount deemed to
have been invested or one-half of the total monies advanced.
Pursuant to a permissible venture agreement, the Financier is not
allowed to recover such monies if the Recipient proves that there
are net business losses or insufficient profits, even where the Recipient is financially solvent. Nevertheless, given the likelihood
that the Recipient could satisfactorily establish these facts is exceedingly small, the net increase in risk is negligible.
Additionally, public policy would be served by characterization of a permissible venture as a secular loan. With respect to
tax law, for instance, the Supreme Court of the United States has
declared that state law characterizations of a particular business
entity or form are not controlling." 5 Even where a taxpayer has
complied with the letter of the tax law in structuring a particular
type of transaction, the courts can disregard the technical form
and tax what it perceives to be the substance of the transaction." 16 This is true even where there are possible, although unlikely, scenarios in which the form of the transaction will have
substantive significance. Although there is no reported federal
tax case involving a permissible venture, courts following substance rather than form under tax law have often treated payments as interest, even though the payments used very different
115 See Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). In addition, the Internal
Revenue Service Treasury Regulations do not find state law classifications controlling. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-4.
116 The seminal case in this area is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In
Helvering, the taxpayer was a shareholder in corporation X; Corporation X owned
1,000 shares of corporation Y. The taxpayer desired to have corporation X convey
to her the 1,000 shares of corporation Y in order for the taxpayer to sell the shares
for profit. If accomplished directly, the conveyance would have been treated as a
dividend to the taxpayer which would be taxed as ordinary income. In order to be
taxed at the then lower capital gain rate, the taxpayer caused a reorganization
under section 1 2(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928. The court disregarded the reorganization, which was declared to have been a sham because the underlying tax
avoidance motive was outside the plain intent of the reorganization statute.
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labels. 1 7 The commercial function of payments made pursuant
to a permissible venture agreement is to permit a substitution for
religiously prohibited interest. Consequently, payments pursuant to a permissible venture should be treated as interest.
Similarly, in examining usury implications, substance generally controls form. The courts examine all of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction in an effort to ascertain the parties'
intent."' If the fixed rate of return, based on the total funds advanced by the Financier, exceeds allowable interest rates, a court
should find that the transaction was a usurious loan.
vi.

Proposed Permissible Venture Provisions

It is obviously essential that the document be prepared carefully by a trained professional. The following provisions should
be included in a permissible venture document to minimize the
probability that a court would find that a partnership was created.
First, the agreement should state that it is merely for Jewish law
purposes and that, although its specific terms are intended to be
enforceable under secular law," 9 the agreement is not intended
to establish any sort of partnership or joint venture under secular
law. 120 The agreement should indicate that, under Jewish law,
117 See, e.g., Dorzbach v. Collison, 195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952) (25% share of profits paid in lieu of interest held deductible as interest); Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v.
Commissioner, 23 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1927) ("Sums paid as interest, regardless of
the name by which it is called, may be deducted by the taxpayer from its income.");
Kena, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 217, 219-21 (1941) (80% share of profits
paid in lieu of interest held deductible as interest); Wynnefield Heights, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 953, 960, 66,185 T.C.M. (P-H) 66-1071, 661079 (1966) (payment of a fixed amount per constructed house in lieu of interest
held deductible as interest); Rev. Rul. 69-188, 969-1, C.B. 54 (interest is "the
amount one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money, and as compensation paid for the use or forbearance of money" not dependent on the parties'
characterization of the transaction).
118 See Call v. Palmer, 116 U.S. 98 (1885); Curtis v. LeMoyne, 248 Iii. App. 99,
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 645 (1928).
119 If the rabbinic authorities upon whom the parties to the permissible venture
rely believe that the permissible venture need not be enforceable under secular law
in order to be valid under Jewish law, then the permissible venture document
should clearly recite that it is only to be effective under Jewish law and not under
secular law. This might indeed insulate the parties from the implications discussed
in the text.
120 The label which parties give to their relationship is of some limited weight
when courts determine whether a partnership was formed. See, e.g., Chariton Feed
and Grain, Inc. v. Harder, 369 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1985) (written agreement between tenant and landlord not conclusive of partnership); Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 133 N.J.L. 295, 44 A.2d 172 (E. & A. 1945) (written
partnership agreement is evidence, but not conclusive of existence of partnership).
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the permissible venture arrangement does not authorize the Recipient to obligate the Financier personally in any way. Furthermore, the document should state that the Recipient is not
intended to have, under secular law, any actual or apparent authority to bind the Financier.
Second, the agreement should specify that the Recipient is
barred from releasing the Financier's name, disclosing that a permissible venture was executed and representing that a religious
or secular partnership was established. These restrictions should
reduce the Financier's exposure to third party claims based on
estoppel. The permissible venture agreement should also indicate that the liability of the Financier is limited to the amount of
money invested. 12 ' The agreement should also specify that the
Financier is not personally liable for the debts of the venture or
22
for the claims of the Recipient or of third parties.
Third, the agreement should contain an indemnification and
"hold harmless" clause, shielding the Financier from any liability
in excess of his investment. A clause should also be inserted specifically stating that the Recipient has no control whatsoever over
the Recipient's business, 23 and that any losses in the permissible
venture business must be proved through competent testimony
under Jewish law.' 24 In addition, the agreement should indicate
that there is an irrebuttable presumption that the Financier's
funds were invested in those business activities of the Recipient
which were in fact most profitable during the term of the permissible venture agreement.
Finally, to the extent that the Financier is willing, the agreement should indicate that it is the parties' intention that, under
secular law, the Financier's investment should be treated as a
conditional, non-recourse loan.
Even if a court determines that no partnership was formed, it
may still enforce the express terms of the permissible venture
121 In a permissible venture the Financier's investment equals one-half of the total sum advanced.
122 If the permissible venture is treated as a secular partnership, a statement purporting to limit a partner's liability to third parties will be ineffective. Nevertheless,
this type of declaration may be relevant when the court considers the threshold
question of whether the permissible venture created a partnership.
123 This provision is not necessary if, of course, there is some special reason why
the Financier wants control. In deciding whether the Financier desires control, the
Financier should evaluate the prospects for the imposition of lender liability. See
supra note 15.
124 The purpose of this provision is to minimize the likelihood that the Recipient
can prove losses.
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agreement under contract law. By taking the prescribed oath or
producing the Specified witnesses, the Recipient could frustrate
the Financier's practical expectations. To reduce the likelihood
of this result, the permissible venture should contain a clause
providing that the Recipient must invest the funds diligently and
with scrupulous care and that the Recipient bears various responsibilities for the safeguarding of the funds. The agreement
should provide that the Recipient must satisfy specified conditions regarding the type of venture which may be pursued and
that the Recipient must make ongoing financial disclosures.
If the Recipient chooses to take an oath to establish that the
actual profits of the venture were less than the presumed
amount, the agreement should state that the oath must also include a statement that the Recipient has faithfully fulfilled all of
his obligations and responsibilities under the permissible venture
agreement. Furthermore, if the Recipient chooses to bring witnesses to testify that the venture sustained losses, the Recipient
must take an oath that he has faithfully fulfilled all of his obligations and responsibilities under the permissible venture
agreement.
Finally, if the Financier contends that the Recipient has
not faithfully performed one or more of the Recipient's obligations or responsibilities, the Recipient must prove through two
qualified witnesses that he has faithfully performed his
responsibilities.
If he has confidence in the truthfulness of his statement, a
Jewish Recipient might overcome his general aversion to oathtaking, particularly if the stakes are high. Consequently, where
there is a clear and unexpectedly large liability, a Recipient might
be inclined to take an oath. Requiring that the oath also recite
that the Recipient's many other duties were performed, particularly those responsibilities which are difficult to precisely define,
makes it less probable that a Recipient will take the oath. Moreover, requiring an oath in addition to the production of witnesses
decreases the already remote likelihood that losses will be
established.
The references to Jewish law in the permissible venture
agreement' might raise enforceability problems under secular law
which would endanger the Financier's ability to recover his
money.' 2 5 To avoid this risk, the permissible venture agreement
125 Suppose, for example, that the Recipient called two witnesses to establish that
there were net losses and the Financier contended that the witnesses were not qual-

1989]

PERMISSIBLE VENTURE

should also include a clause requiring compulsory submission of
any dispute to a particular rabbinic court for binding arbitration
based on Jewish law. The provision should be crafted to ensure
that, under applicable state law, any arbitration award could be
entered as a judgment in state court.
A sample permissible venture containing or referring to
these provisions is printed below in the Appendix.
C. An Alternative Form for the Permissible Venture: The Non-recourse
Loan

Despite the foregoing arguments, a substantial risk remains
that the form of a permissible venture which incorporates elements analogous to a secular partnership will compel a reviewing
court to treat it as a partnership with all the attendant adverse
consequences. Accordingly, the following section suggests that
in some cases a permissible venture could be restructured as a
non-recourse loan, a familiar non-partnership form.
In a typical non-recourse loan, a lender provides funds to a
borrower, obtains collateral to secure repayment of the funds
and agrees that, in the event of default, the borrower will not be
ified underJewish law or that their testimony was not competent or sufficient under
Jewish law standards. A secular court might decide that it could not properly evaluate or determine such religious questions, even with the assistance of expert witnesses. Consequently, a secular court could refrain from ruling on the dispute. See
Serbia Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, rehk'g denied, 429
U.S. 873 (1976). Although secular courts have determined or taken judicial notice
of certain precepts ofJewish law, it is unclear whether those cases involved a genuine dispute as to the relevant rules. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 223 N.J. Super. 219,
538 A.2d 438 (Ch. Div. 1987) (Jewish husband required to secure Jewish bill of
divorcement); Rubin v. Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Fam.Ct.
1973) (support provisions of divorce conditional on wife's obtaining Jewish divorce).
Some have suggested that there is a distinction between matters involving religious dogma and those relating to religious civil law. See Minkin v. Minkin, 180 NJ.
Super. 260, 437 A.2d 665 (Ch. Div. 1981). The general qualification of the Jewish
law witnesses and evidentiary standards could be characterized as civil, and therefore, a court could arguably apply them just as the court might proceed if the parties had agreed to be bound by the law of a foreign country. But this distinction
would collapse when applied to the eligibility of Jewish law witnesses. Improper
religious observance can disqualify a witness and a secular court is unlikely to rule
on the conduct which constitutes proper ritual performance.
Alternatively, a court could find that there was an implicit agreement between
the parties to submit disputes to a rabbinical court. In the family law context, the
parties to a Jewish marriage who agreed to wed in accordance with Jewish law also
implicitly agreed to comply with a rabbinical court's decision regarding divorce. See
id. The Financier in the permissible venture context could argue that, in agreeing
to provide witnesses who were reliable and trustworthy under Jewish law, the parties agreed to submit any disputes concerning the qualification of witnesses.
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personally liable to the lender. The lender will collect only from
the collateral. A permissible venture is similar in that a Recipient
is not personally liable to the extent that he satisfactorily proves
that the venture sustained net losses.
In non-recourse loans, however, lenders usually limit the
amount advanced to a fraction of the value of the collateral obtained. In this way, even if the value of the property depreciates,
the lenders can recover all of their money. A permissible venture
is different because, if the borrower suffers losses in the venture
business which he can prove, Jewish law forbids the Financier
from collecting the full amount of the principal, even from collateral. The Financier must deduct from his claim an amount equal
to one-half of the losses.
This formal procedure explicitly requiring that the Financier
share in the losses may lead a court to rule that the permissible
venture is a partnership. If the transaction can be restructured as
a non-recourse loan, the court might reach a different conclusion. The problem is finding collateral which would automatically decrease in value if the venture incurs net losses, thereby
satisfying the requirements of Jewish law.
One choice is to establish a fractional interest in the assets of
the venture. The numerator of the fraction would be the number
of dollars advanced and the denominator would be the sum of
26
the numbers invested by both the Financier and the Recipient. 1
Consider, for example, a permissible venture in which a Financier advances $100, $50 as an interest-free loan and $50 as an
investment. The Recipient invests the $50 which was provided as
a loan. On the $50 of investment funds, 12 7 the Financier might
receive an undivided 50% security interest in the assets of the
permissible venture business. To ensure that the Financier does
not collect more than the amount permitted by the permissible
venture, the security interest must be expressly subordinated to
the claims of the Recipient's creditors. The security interest
should, however, be perfected to establish its priority over other
potential personal creditors of the Recipient who were not in1 28
volved in the permissible venture business.
126 The Recipient's investment would include the present value of any pre-existing assets that the Recipient has dedicated to the business.
127 Regarding the monies provided as an interest-free loan, the Recipient could
be personally liable and could grant whatever security interest is agreed upon. Any
security interest could be set forth in a separate document or could be incorporated
in the security document dealing with the Financier's investment.
128 Another reason to perfect the security interest is to maintain its priority over
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A Financier desires that, whenever possible, the Recipient is
personally liable for full repayment of the monies advanced as an
investment. Under Jewish law, personal liability is not permitted
if the existence and extent of losses is properly established. The
permissible venture agreement, under the non-recourse loan
model, could provide that, even if there are losses, the Recipient
would be personally responsible for losses if he violated particular terms or conditions, including restrictions on allowable permissible venture businesses or the requirements of diligence and
best efforts in the pursuit of the business.1 29 The subordination
of the Financier's rights to the collateral could be similarly
conditioned.
In specific circumstances, technical problems may arise in
connection with using the non-recourse loan alternative. For example, where the funds are used in a cash-loss period to build up
intangible assets such as good will, the security interest may not
be meaningful collateral. Alternatively, if the assets of the venture are subject to a pre-existing security interest, then the Financier would not be assured of repayment of his principal even if
the venture suffers no losses. Moreover, in order for a financing
statement to be effective, it must describe the collateral which is
covered. The parties will either have to list the pertinent assets
or describe them as the assets used in the venture. To make the
description meaningful and effective, the parties may have to
agree upon and identify the parameters of the venture's business.
Specifying the business at the outset, however, may detrimentally
affect the Financier. Under Jewish law, specificity is not required
and the Financier's investment is deemed to have been made in
the Recipient's most profitable business activity during the term
of the venture.
Assuming that a permissible venture could be structured as a
non-recourse loan in a particular case, the first question is
whether the combination of a non-recourse debt and profit-sharing, evidences a partnership. It seems that the combination does
the rights of other claimants and to prevent avoidance of the obligation in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
129 A modified non-recourse loan model might provide for the Recipient's personal liability, collateralized by a security interest in all of the venture's assets unless the Recipient properly proves losses, in which case the liability would be
transformed into the non-recourse debt discussed in the text and collateralized by a
security interest in only a fraction of the venture's assets. If feasible, this alternative
would grant the Financier greater protection. Unfortunately, because conditional
loan schemes are not in general use, a court might be less inclined to treat the
arrangement as a loan.
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not establish a partnership. Non-recourse loans are often
made,' 3 0 without causing the lender to be considered a partner of
the borrower. 13 ' Authorities, including the UPA, have determined that receipt of a percentage of profits in lieu of interest on
a loan does not establish a partnership. 32 A number of cases
have determined that an investor is a partner where the obligation to repay depends on the profitability of the business. The
use of a non-recourse loan appears functionally tantamount to
conditioning the repayment obligation on the profitability of the
partnership. If there are no losses, then the value of the collateral will permit full repayment of the funds. If there are losses
which are properly established, the collateral will be worth less
than the full amount of the funds advanced and the loan will not
be repaid in full. Nonetheless, if form alone is followed, use of a
non-recourse debt should avoid the conclusion that the permissible venture constitutes a partnership. Alternatively, if substance
rather than form is applied, it should be used to evaluate the entire transaction. For the reasons set forth above, 33 the transaction, considered as a whole, should be classified as a
substantively unconditional repayment obligation.
V.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE BAN ON INTEREST

A formal limited partnership might be used by religious Jews
instead of the permissible venture format. This alternative offers
the Financier limited liability, safeguarding him from many of the
34
more serious risks associated with treatment as a partnership.
There are, however, a few drawbacks to the limited partnership
format. First, some institutional lenders may be precluded from
entering limited partnerships. Second, formalization of a limited
partnership structure might militate against treating the Recipient's payments as interest for tax purposes. Third, the need to
comply with the statutory requirements of a limited partnership
may be costly and inconvenient, consuming precious time before
a closing. Fourth, even where there is a limited partnership, it is
possible for the limited partner to unwittingly become liable as a
general partner by participation in the partnership business.35
130

See supra note 77.

131 See Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377, 1435 (1980) (non-recourse nature

of mortgage does not preclude taxpayer from claiming depreciation).
132 But see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text at IV, B.
134 See supra text at III, B.
135 Even in a traditional debtor-creditor relationship, there is an inherent risk
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If a third party sues a Financier, alleging that the Financier is
a general partner, the Financier may ignore some of the above
problems and attempt to escape liability through applicable
ULPA or RULPA provisions.' 3 6 The Financier must assert that,
in good faith, he erroneously believed that through the permissible venture agreement he had become a limited partner. The
Financier would be required either to renounce his interest in the
partnership or to cause a certificate of limited partnership to be
filed. A practical problem might arise because of the statutory
requirement that the general partner, the Recipient, execute the
certificate of limited partnership. 37 The Recipient might refuse
to execute a certificate of limited partnership, preferring to have
the Financier share in the liability. 3 8 If the Financier can establish that the permissible venture is in fact a limited partnership,
he may be able to obtain a court order requiring the Recipient to
execute and file the certificate.' 3 9 If the Financier is either sophisticated or represented by counsel, it may be difficult to establish that he believed in good faith that he was a limited partner
because he was presumably aware that no certificate of limited
partnership was filed.
Some rabbis have informally suggested that, as an alternative, an institutional lender earmark a certain portion of its deposits originating from non-Jewish sources for use in making
loans to Jews. In this manner, they contend the loan is made
directly from the non-Jewish depositors to the Jewish borrowers
and no prohibition on exacting interest is involved. This argument, however, misstates the nature of the depository relationship. A deposit in a bank is a loan to the bank. When the
institution lends money to others, it is lending its own money
and, if the institution and the borrower are both Jewish, the prohibition against lending with interest applies. 4 °
that the creditor will exercise control exposing the creditor to direct liability. See
supra note 15.
136 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
137 REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 204, 6 U.L.A. 297 (1989).

The probability of the occurrence of this problem would be substantially diminished if the permissible venture agreement were properly drafted and required
the Recipient to indemnify and hold the Financier harmless from any liability in
excess of the monies invested.
139 REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 207, 6 U.L.A. 281 (1989); UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25, 6 U.L.A. 610 (1969).
140 The proposal also assumes that the funds deposited by non-Jewish sources
can be maintained and dealt with as a distinct asset, despite the fact that any funds
physically deposited may be commingled and that any funds wired or carried on the
books of the Federal Reserve do not physically exist to be separately maintained.
138
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These rabbis have alternatively proposed that a corporate
lender segregate the equitable rights of its non-Jewish and Jewish
shareholders so that there would be a fund of non-Jewish money
which would be used exclusively for loans to Jews. A similar
amount of money which is equitably owned by Jewish shareholders would be used for loans to other borrowers. In this way, a
partnership would not be established between the lender corporation and Jewish borrowers. Instead, the parties would participate in a straight loan of money, from the non-Jewish
shareholders to Jewish borrowers. The interests of Jewish and
non-Jewish shareholders would be linked, at least to a certain extent, to the performance of different groups of loans. As a result,
the rights of the shareholders in dissolution and in declaration
and issuance of dividends would theoretically differ. To avoid
any actual difference, there would be a presumption that the two
groups of loans performed equally well. This presumption
should be rebuttable only if a shareholder, prior to issuance of a
dividend or liquidation right, could conclusively prove, by a specified and almost impossibly demanding standard of proof, that
the respective groups of loans performed differently.
The primary problem with this proposal is that, given the
theoretical difference in the rights of Jewish and non-Jewish
shareholders, two classes of common stock must be established:
one class owned by Jewish shareholders and the other owned by
non-Jews. 14 ' Assuming the initial creation of such classes, if nonJewish stockholders sold their shares to Jews, the Jewish law prohibition on interest would be violated in ongoing and future
loans. Yet, it is inconceivable that a corporation could legally restrict ownership of its stock on religious grounds. Even if restrictions could be imposed, the attendant practical problems,
including the enforcement of the restriction itself, would be significant. Moreover, this process would involve the possibility of
undesired publicity for a corporation which does not want to be
perceived as making religiously based distinctions.
As a final alternative, the lender could avoid permissible ventures altogether and attempt to accommodate its religious Jewish
customers in other ways. There is, for example, a rabbinic view
that allows lending with interest if the borrower is not personally
141 The rights of shareholders emanates from the ownership of stock. The only
conceptual manner in which to restrict the shareholders' respective rights is to affect the type of stock they own.
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liable for the debt. 42 Therefore, a religiously observant Jew
might deposit money into an account with a Jewish bank without
a permissible venture agreement, because the shareholders of
43
the corporation are not personally liable to the depositor.
Similarly, a lender might elect to make traditional non-recourse
loans to religiously observant Jews. 1 44 Any additional risk incident to a non-recourse debt might motivate the lender to marginally increase the financing fee or to require additional
collateral.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It seems that there is sufficient flexibility within the Jewish
and American legal systems to permit Jews to avoid their religious ban on the collection and payment of interest without incurring the significant responsibilities imposed on a partner
under secular law.
Certainly, a permissible venture for a non-business purpose
should not give rise to a partnership. The relationship simply
lacks critical partnership criteria. Moreover, other permissible
ventures, if they are properly drafted, should not be treated as
partnerships. There is no significant public policy which would
require Financiers to be treated as partners. Virtually identical
financial goals are satisfied, either through investments in corpo142 There is a possible problem, however, if during the term of the loan to or
from the Jewish customer, the majority stock ownership shifts from non-Jews to
Jews. In that case, theJewish customer would have to liquidate its account by withdrawing his deposits and paying off his loans. Therefore, it would be preferable for
a lender to continuously keep track of the relevant percentages and to notify religious Jews of any significant changes. The disadvantage of this approach is that the
influx ofJewish customers may be chilled by the risk that they would have to liquidate accounts in the future.
143 It is interesting to note that a religiously observant Jew desiring to deposit
money in a Jewish bank will not necessarily be able to accomplish his religious objective by merely convincing the bank to enter into a permissible venture with him.
Through the permissible venture, the depositor would become a partner with the
bank as to the bank's other business activities. Consequently, the depositor might
become a partner of the bank as to interest-bearing loans made by the bank to
other Jews. Presumably this problem could be solved if the permissible venture
between the depositor and the bank is restricted to the bank's commercial activities
with non-Jews.
144 Under Jewish law it would probably be best if the language of the non-recourse loan stated that there would be no personal obligation on the borrower,
either as a matter of secular law or as a matter of religious law, to repay the loan.
The agreement should also specify that if the loan were not repaid in accordance
with its terms, the lender would be entitled to any and all rights against the collateral set forth in the respective collateral documentation.
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rate stock or in limited partnerships, without the imposition of
personal liability. Indeed, treating permissible ventures as loans
will promote tax and usury law policies.
In addition, courts have historically evaluated the substance
of a transaction to determine whether a partnership relationship
was established. The substance of a permissible venture is the
same as a loan because the rights and responsibilities of the Financier are much more like those of a lender than those of a general partner. The Financier has no control in the business of the
partnership; nor does he fully enjoy the business' appreciation.
As a practical matter, the Recipient will not share in the profits
and losses of the business. Instead, the Recipient will almost undoubtedly receive a fixed schedule of payments, either because it
is practically or theoretically impossible to calculate the profits or
losses. A fixed return is likely because the Recipient will rarely
take steps to keep track of the profits or losses, or, alternatively,
because the Recipient will be unable or unwilling to take the required oath and/or adduce the prescribed witnesses. Even if
there is some sharing of profits and losses, 1 45 this factor alone
should be insufficient to cause the relationship to be declared a
partnership. The fact that the parties' expressed motive is to
avoid a religious ban, not to form a secular partnership should
mitigate against treatment as a partnership. Therefore, the better rule would treat a permissible venture as a loan, not a secular
partnership.
Casting the secular aspects of the transaction as a non-recourse loan may make it easier for a secular court to avoid characterizing
the parties'
relationship
as a partnership.
Nevertheless, practical problems, including a Financier's possible
unwillingness to abandon the broader protection afforded by a
permissible venture agreement, may preclude this alternative.
Of course, the substance versus form approach is applied on
a case by case basis, exposing a lender to the vagaries of possible
litigation. A lender who seeks greater protection against personal liability as a partner might choose formal limited partnerships for its permissible venture arrangements. This choice,
however, would not resolve issues concerning applicable regulatory restrictions. Finally, the availability of other alternatives
would depend on the Jewish law views of the persons involved.
145 The permissible venture agreement should provide for only a limited sharing
of losses, not for the unlimited sharing which is incidental to a partnership.
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE PERMISSIBLE VENTURE AGREEMENT

(HETTER ISKA)1

46

THIS

AGREEMENT
is
entered
into
between
(the "Financier") and _ (the "Recipient"),
this __
day of
WHEREAS, the Recipient is desirous of engaging in one or
more legal business enterprises (referred to hereinbelow as the
"Business"); and
WHEREAS, the Recipient has insufficient funds for the Business; and
WHEREAS, Jewish law prohibits the payment or collection
of interest on loans between Jews; and
WHEREAS, but for the Jewish law prohibition on the payment or collection of interest on loans between Jews, the Financier would have been willing to lend the sum of $
(amount
in writing) referred to hereinbelow on an interest-bearing basis;
and
WHEREAS, Jewish law permits the Financier to provide the
$
(amount in writing) referred to hereinbelow in a way set
forth hereinbelow; and
WHEREAS, the Financier and the Recipient enter into this
Agreement in order that the Financier provide, and the Recipient
receive, the $
(amount in writing) referred to hereinbelow
while avoiding the Jewish law prohibition on the payment and
collection of interest on loans between Jews; and
WHEREAS, under Jewish law, the terms set forth hereinbelow do not authorize the Recipient to obligate the Financier personally in any way; and
WHEREAS, the terms set forth hereinbelow are not intended, under the laws of the State of
, or
under any other secular law, to authorize the Recipient to obligate the Financier in any way; and
WHEREAS, the fact that, as set forth hereinbelow, the Fin146 The provisions set forth below in brackets are optional. Refer to section IV of
this article for a discussion of the function and usefulness of the proposed
provisions.
As indicated in the text, there are disparate rabbinic opinions on Jewish law.
Consequently, a person concerned with Jewish law requirements should consult a
rabbinic authority of his choice to determine the propriety of this form.
Additionally, some states require consumer contracts to be drafted in language
which may be plainly understood by the general population. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. 56:12-1 et seq. (West 1989).
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ancier is providing the Recipient with the Deposit or Investment
terms which are defined hereinbelow, may enable the Financier
to pursue various different business enterprises without having to
liquidate assets from one enterprise in order to invest in another;
and
WHEREAS, the terms set forth hereinbelow establish what
would be designated under Jewish law as a shutfus; and
WHEREAS, the Jewish law of shutfus differs significantly
from the law of joint ventures, partnerships and agencies of the
State of
and under other secular law; and
WHEREAS, the parties specifically intend that the terms set
forth hereinbelow not form a partnership, joint venture, agency
relationship or any other similar relationship between them
under the laws of the State of
or under
any other secular law; [and
WHEREAS, the parties believe that under the laws of the
State of
or under other secular law,
although not under Jewish law, the provisions set forth hereinbelow regarding the $
(amount in writing), delivered to the
Recipient, which is hereinbelow defined as the "Deposit" or "Investment" should be characterized as a non-recourse loan from
the Financier to the Recipient (Note, if this clause is used, the
lender should be especially insistent on receiving a perfectible
security interest in collateral for the loan); and
WHEREAS,
the fact that laws of the State of
or other secular law may label the said
provisions regarding the Deposit or Investment a loan does not
cause the provisions to be proscribed under Jewish law;]
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto, in mutual consideration of the representations and promises set forth hereinbelow,
and for other good and valid legal consideration, hereby agree,
represent and promise as follows:
1. RECITALS. The foregoing recitals are incorporated
herein and made a part hereof.
2. RECEIPT OF FUNDS. The Recipient hereby acknowledges receipt, contemporaneous herewith, of the aggregate sum
of $
(amount in writing) (the "Funds") from the Financier.
3. NON-INTEREST BEARING LOAN. The Financier and
Recipient hereby acknowledge that fifty percent of the Funds, or
$
(amount in writing), was received by the Recipient as a
non-interest bearing loan (the "Loan") from the Financier, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
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4. DEPOSIT OR INVESTMENT. The Financier and Recipient acknowledge that fifty percent of the Funds, or $
(amount in writing), was received by the Recipient as a deposit or
investment (the "Deposit") from the Financier.
5. SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS AND
PROMISES OF THE RECIPIENT. The Recipient agrees, represents and promises, without limitation, as follows:
a. The Recipient shall not disclose or confirm to any party
the fact that this Agreement was entered into, nor shall the Recipient enter into, make or confirm any representation that a religious or secular partnership, joint venture or agency relationship
was established between it and the Financier; provided, however,
that this provision in no way restricts the Recipient: (1) from
making any oral or written statements to the Rabbinic Court referred to in paragraph "12" hereinbelow; (2) from raising the
existence of this permissible venture agreement as a defense to
any action instituted by the Financier in a secular court; or (3)
from making a statement required of the Recipient by secular
law;
b. The Recipient shall not in any way use the Financier's
name in connection with the business conducted by the Recipient
pursuant to this Agreement;
c. The Recipient shall invest the Loan in the Business and at
no time during the term of this Agreement shall the Recipient
withdraw any part of the Loan from the Business;
d. The Recipient shall invest the Deposit and all undistributed profits therefrom or proceeds thereof with diligence and
with scrupulous care, which the parties hereto recognize as requiring more than the mere exercise by the Recipient of its business judgment, on behalf of the Financier in the Business;
e. There shall be an irrebuttable presumption that the Deposit was invested by the Recipient in the most profitable business activity or activities that the Recipient pursued during the
term of this permissible venture agreement. If no activity was
profitable, there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that the
Deposit was invested by the Recipient in the business activity or
activities which under the terms of this permissible venture
agreement would be the least unprofitable to the Financier. In
order to establish that there were no profits pursuant to paragraph "7" hereinbelow, the Recipient must take the oath described therein as to each business activity that he so pursued. In
order to establish that there were net losses pursuant to para-
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graph "5h" hereinbelow, the Recipient must adduce proper witnesses as to each such business activity that he so pursued;
f. The Recipient shall immediately notify the Financier of the
extent of any net losses from the Business during any monthly
period; (Other restrictive conditions may be added regarding the
manner or type of business which can be pursued, the manner in
which the deposit, the profit therefrom or the proceeds thereof
are maintained or protected, or the manner or the type of ongoing financial disclosures required from the Recipient.)
g. The Recipient shall defend the Financier against, hold the
Financier harmless from, and indemnify the Financier as to, any
loss, debt, obligation or liability which might arise under or as a
result of this Agreement, other than for the loss of part or all of
the Deposit pursuant to paragraph "5h" hereinbelow;
h. The Recipient shall repay to the Financier the amount of
the Deposit on or before
, along with the
Financier's share of any undistributed profits therefrom; provided, however, that if the Business has net losses, the amount
the Financier shall be obligated to repay shall be reduced by an
amount obtained by multiplying the total net losses by a fraction
whose numerator is the Deposit and whose denominator is the
total amount of money, including the Deposit, which is invested
in the Business. In the event that the Recipient fails to make such
payment on time, he shall be in breach of this Agreement. Nonetheless, until the payment is made, the Recipient shall continue
to be responsible for the Deposit on the terms and conditions set
forth in this Agreement.
In the event of any dispute as to the existence or amount of
net losses, the Recipient shall have the burden of proving that
there were net losses and, the extent thereof. He may prove the
existence and extent of net losses, as well as the extent of other
money invested in the Business, only by offering the competent
testimony of [either specify two particular persons and require
that they are qualified to offer testimony at the time of the dispute or simply refer to "two persons qualified to offer testimony"]. Competence and qualification are to be determined in
accordance with Jewish law. In addition, to be effective, the testimony must establish that there were net losses the extent of the
losses, and the amount of the total investment in each and every
one of the business activities which the Recipient pursued during
the term of this permissible venture agreement.
In the event that the Recipient adduces such testimony, he
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must also take a solemn oath administered by (name of particular
rabbi(s) or rabbinic organization) in (name of place) in front of
(names of particular people or congregation) while holding a Torah scroll in which oath the Recipient states that the Recipient
has faithfully fulfilled all of his obligations and responsibilities
under this permissible venture agreement, including, without
limitation, that he has invested the Deposit diligently and with
scrupulous care.
[The Recipient hereby grants to the Financier a __
TO
[this percentage should be determined by a fraction whose numerator is the amount of the Deposit and whose denominator is
the sum of the amount of the Deposit and the amount which the
Recipient is to invest in the Business] security interest in the assets used in the Business, said security interest being expressly
subordinate to the claims of creditors of the Business.]
Upon such repayment, title to any property vesting under
Jewish law in the Financier pursuant to paragraph "6" hereof,
shall automatically vest in the Financier.
i. The Recipient shall account for and pay to Financier, on
the
__
day of each month of the civil calendar, beginning
, any rights of the Financier to profits from the Business,
as set forth in paragraph "7" hereof.
j. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs "h" and
"i" above, in the event that there are net Business losses in any
monthly period or in the event that the Recipient breaches this
Agreement, the Financier may immediately require the repayment of the Loan and the Deposit, plus the Financier's share of
profits to date, pursuant to paragraph "7" hereinbelow, or minus
the Financier's share of net losses to date, pursuant to paragraph
"5h" hereinabove.
6. TITLE TO OBJECTS ACQUIRED. Under Jewish law, title to any objects acquired through use of the Deposit, the profits
therefrom or proceeds thereof shall be vested in the Financier.
The Recipient may commingle the proceeds with the Loan or
with other monies invested by the Recipient. In the event of such
commingling, the title, underJewish law, of any objects acquired
through the use of the deposit, the profits therefrom or the proceeds thereof, shall vest in the Financier and Recipient with the
proportionate undivided share of each being equal to his respective share of the total monies so invested in the Business.
Nevertheless, under the laws of the State of
, and under other secular law, including
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the Internal Revenue Code, such title shall not vest in the Financier, but in the Recipient, provided that this provision does not
cause this Agreement, or any part hereof, to be violative of Jewish law.
7. FINANCIER'S RIGHTS TO PROFITS. The Financier
and the Recipient shall share all net profits from the Business on
an equal basis. Thus, the Financier shall receive an amount obtained by multiplying the net profits by a fraction whose numerator is the Deposit and whose denominator is the total amount
invested in the said Business. Nonetheless, the Recipient anticipates net profits of at least
per annum of the Deposit. It
shall be presumed that the Business was profitable to this extent
until and unless the Recipient takes a solemn oath administered
by (name of particular rabbi(s) or rabbinic organization) in (name
of place) in front of (names of particular people or congregation)
while holding a Torah scroll in which oath the Recipient: (1)
states that there was no business activity which the Recipient pursued during the term of this permissible venture agreement in
which there was a profit equal to or more than
per annum of the Deposit; (2) identifies which of the business activities
were most profitable and, as to each, specifies the profits which
were made; and (3) states that the Recipient has faithfully fulfilled all of his obligations and responsibilities under this permissible venture agreement, including, without limitation, that he
has invested the Deposit diligently and with scrupulous care.
The Financier agrees to forgive its claims as to any excess profits
if, for such applicable period, the Recipient pays to the Financier
an amount equal to _
% (this should be one-half of the percentage figure filled in on the first blank in this subparagraph)
per annum on the aggregate sum of the Funds.
8. PAYMENT TO THE RECIPIENT. The Recipient acknowledges receipt, contemporaneous herewith, of $1.00 as
compensation under Jewish law for his services in connection
with the Deposit.
9. PROOF OF RECIPIENT'S PERFORMANCE. In the
event that the Financier contends that the Recipient has failed to
faithfully discharge one or more of the Recipient's obligations or
responsibilities hereunder, the Recipient shall have the burden of
proving that he has faithfully fulfilled all said obligations and responsibilities. He may prove compliance and fulfillment only by
offering the competent testimony of two persons qualified to of_%

___%

1989]

129

PERMISSIBLE VENTURE

fer testimony. Such competence and qualification are to be determined in accordance with Jewish law.
10. RECIPIENT'S CONTROL OF BUSINESS. The Financier shall have no control over or responsibility for the management or operation of the Business. Control shall belong
exclusively to the Recipient.
11. REFERENCES TO JEWISH LAW. Any references
herein to "Jewish law" are intended to refer to religious rules
pertaining to Jews which are set forth in Shulkhan Arukh.
12. MANDATORY, BINDING ARBITRATION. (Insert a
clause requiring mandatory, binding arbitration before a specific
rabbinic panel empowered to authorize an arbitration award
based on Jewish law. Ensure that the clause meets all of the conditions required in the particular jurisdiction to permit an award
resulting from arbitration to be docketed as a civil judgment.)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto place their
hands and seals hereon, this

WITNESS:

day of _,

19

